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Article

Adaptive Federalism: The Case Against
Reallocating Environmental Regulatory
Authority
David E. Adelman† and Kirsten H. Engel††
A hallmark of environmental federalism is that neither
federal nor state governments limit themselves to what many
legal scholars have deemed to be their appropriate domains.
The federal government continues to regulate local issues, such
as remediation of contaminated industrial sites, which have
few direct interstate connections and few benefits from federal
uniformity. At the same time, state and local governments are
not content to confine their attention to issues of local concern,
but are developing policies on environmental issues of national
or even international scale, such as global climate change. Nor
do environmental issues “stay” in the control of any particular
level of government, but rather tend to pass back and forth between them like the proverbial football.
The current system of environmental federalism is thus a
dynamic one of overlapping federal and state jurisdiction. This
dynamic system is threatened, however, by federal legislation
and Supreme Court rulings. A wave of preemptive legislation
has emerged from Congress in recent years.1 For example, an
† Associate Professor, James E. Rogers College of Law, University of
Arizona. Copyright © 2008 by David E. Adelman and Kirsten H. Engel.
†† Professor, James E. Rogers College of Law, University of Arizona. The
authors would like to thank Graeme Austin, Dan Esty, Dan Farber, Carol
Rose, J.B. Ruhl, Ted Schneyer, and the participants in the conference on “Federalism in the Overlapping Territory,” held at Duke Law School, for their
helpful comments and suggestions.
1. PAUL TESKE, REGULATION IN THE STATES 4 –5 (2004) (enumerating
preemptive federal statutes and noting that “more federal preemptions have
occurred in recent decades than over the rest of U.S. history”). In addition,
several federal agencies have recently claimed in the preambles to regulations
in the Federal Register that their regulatory actions preempt state statutory
and common law. William W. Buzbee, Asymmetrical Regulation: Risk, Preemption, and the Floor/Ceiling Distinction, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1547, 1573 (2007).
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early version of an energy bill now pending in Congress would
have preempted state actions to reduce greenhouse gas emissions that contribute to climate change.2 Numerous other bills
would preempt state action on issues related to climate change
and energy efficiency.3 At the same time, the Supreme Court
has not hesitated to preempt state auto pollution regulations,
despite, at best, ambiguous statutory language.4 Such decisions
2. See Edmund L. Andrews, Auto Chiefs Make Headway Against a Mileage Increase, N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 2007, at C1 (reporting that a House bill
would prevent the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) from authorizing
states to regulate vehicle greenhouse gas emissions, thus preempting rules
promulgated by California and adopted by other states). The two powerful
House sponsors, Representatives John Dingell and Rick Boucher, ultimately
abandoned the preemption effort. California Congressional Leaders Defeat Effort to Preempt State’s Climate Change Legislation, CAL. CAPITOL HILL BULL.
(Cal. Inst. for Fed. Pol’y Res., Wash., D.C.), June 22, 2007, at 6, available at
http://www.calinst.org/2007Bullpdf.shtml.
3. See, e.g., H.R. 2927, 110th Cong. § 2(a) (2007) (preempting any state
law or regulation on consumer tire fuel efficiency information that is different
from requirements imposed by the Department of Transportation); Alternative
Fuel Standard Act of 2007, S. 1158, 110th Cong. § 2 (2007) (preempting state
and local laws and regulations relating to the renewable or alternative energy
content of fuels when the Administrator of the EPA issues a waiver during an
“extreme or unusual fuel supply circumstance”); Gasoline for America’s Security Act of 2005, H.R. 3893, 109th Cong. §§ 101, 102, 107 (as presented in
House, Oct. 7, 2005) (preempting state authority regarding the siting and operation of oil refineries on federal lands within a state and authorizing the establishment of a Federal Fuels List of approved fuels and blends); Engine Coolant and Antifreeze Bittering Agent Act of 2005, S. 1110, 109th Cong. § 2
(2005) (preempting state or local laws that impose requirements different from
that of the federal government relating to the inclusion of a bittering agent in
retail engine coolant or antifreeze). A review of bills currently pending before
Congress reveals a heated debate over preemption; several bills on similar topics expressly reject preemption. See Carbon-Neutral Government Act of 2007,
H.R. 2635, 110th Cong. § 104 (2007) (“Nothing in this Act . . . shall be interpreted to preempt or limit the authority of a State to take any action to address global warming.”); Future Fuels Act, H.R. 2296, 110th Cong. § 304(d)(6)
(2007) (“Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to preempt State law relating to higher fuel economy standards applicable to replacement tires designed
for use on passenger cars and trucks.”); H.R. 2215, 110th Cong., § 711 (2007)
(adding a title to the Clean Air Act providing a reduction in greenhouse gas
emissions from vehicles and aircraft and stating that “nothing in this title
shall be interpreted to preempt or limit State actions to address climate
change”).
4. Engine Mfrs. Ass’n v. S. Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., 541 U.S. 246,
258–59 (2004) (holding that section 209(a) of the Clean Air Act preempts California regulations prohibiting the purchase or lease by various public and private fleet operators of vehicles that do not comply with stringent emission requirements); see also Erwin Chemerinsky, Empowering States When It
Matters: A Different Approach to Preemption, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 1313, 1314 –
15 (2004).
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follow a long line of cases in which the Court has preempted a
variety of state actions designed to protect the public.5
This dynamic system is also antithetical to the prevailing
economic orthodoxy of federalism scholars. Legal academics
have long maintained that an optimal level of government exists for regulating a given environmental problem. The orthodox view, which we refer to as the “matching principle,” is premised on the elementary economic theory that efficient
regulation is possible only when the regulating entity fully internalizes the costs and benefits of its policies.6 A corollary of
this principle is that the regulatory authority should reside at
the level of government that roughly “matches” the geographic
scope of the subject environmental problem. Hence regulation
of intrastate groundwater ought to be regulated by state and
local governments,7 whereas climate change should be addressed at the international level. This static model is incompatible with the existing dynamic system, as it precludes overlapping and shifting regulatory authority between the states
and federal government.
We reject the traditional static optimization model for an
adaptive one. Our approach draws on an emerging trend in le5. E.g., Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396 (2003) (addressing the
disclosure of insurance policies sold in Europe between 1920 and 1945); Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001) (cigarette smoking); Geier v.
Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861 (2000) (state tort law).
6. See, e.g., Jonathan H. Adler, Jurisdictional Mismatch in Environmental Federalism, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 130, 157 (2005) (arguing that the division of authority in environmental law is inefficient as it fails to comport with
an analytical framework that reserves issues of national scope to the federal
government and issues of local effect to state governments); Henry N. Butler &
Jonathan R. Macey, Externalities and the Matching Principle: The Case for
Reallocating Environmental Regulatory Authority, 14 YALE L. & POL’Y REV.
23, 25 (1996) (“The Matching Principle suggests that, in general, the size of
the geographic area affected by a specific pollution source should determine
the appropriate governmental level for responding to the pollution. There is no
need for the regulating jurisdiction to be larger than the regulated activity.”);
Daniel C. Esty, Revitalizing Environmental Federalism, 95 MICH. L. REV. 570,
587 (1996) (“Whenever the scope of an environmental harm does not match
the regulator’s jurisdiction, the cost-benefit calculus will be skewed and either
too little or too much environmental protection will be provided.”); Richard O.
Zerbe, Optimal Environmental Jurisdictions, 4 ECOLOGY L.Q. 193, 245 (1974)
(“[W]hile the arguments show the case for local jurisdiction [over environmental regulation] to be strong, important exceptions remain . . . . where there is
undue political influence at local levels, where there is sufficient interjurisdictional pollution, and where technological considerations give substantially
greater efficiency to larger jurisdictions.”).
7. Adler, supra note 6, at 135 (“[M]ost environmental problems are local
or regional.”).
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gal scholarship that calls for a dynamic model of federalism.8
We start with the unremarkable observation that environmental problems are multifaceted. Sources of environmental harm
may be the manifestation of numerous failures, market as well
as regulatory, that arise along numerous dimensions and at
widely variant temporal and spatial scales. Further, the initiative to address environmental problems will originate from
more than one level of government based upon a variety of political, socioeconomic, and environmental factors, each differing
from the other in the mix of these variables.9 This diversity of
contexts proves to be an essential asset in a complex and dynamic world.
The simplicity of the matching principle, in this light,
comes at a significant price because it assumes away much of
the inherent complexity of environmental problems. Further,
the static nature of the matching principle’s economic model
ignores the constantly shifting landscape in which environmental policy is set, with its disruptions from both natural
processes and human interventions.10 Rigid adherence to the
8. See, e.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 4, at 1329; Renee M. Jones, Dynamic Federalism: Competition, Cooperation and Securities Enforcement, 11
CONN. INS. L.J. 107, 109 (2004); Robert A. Schapiro, Polyphonic Federalism:
State Constitutions in the Federal Courts, 87 CAL. L. REV. 1409, 1411–13
(1999).
9. The divergent stands that states have taken on regulating greenhouse
gases reflect this variation, with some states seeking to regulate them aggressively (e.g., California, Oregon, New Jersey) and others formally opposing the
Kyoto Protocol and, in at least one case, barring state regulators from working
with the EPA on voluntary climate-change programs. Tom Arrandale, The Pollution Puzzle, GOVERNING, Aug. 2002, at 22, 23; see also Brian J. Gerber &
Paul Teske, Regulatory Policymaking in the American States: A Review of
Theories and Evidence, 53 POL. RES. Q. 849, 856 (2000) (“[S]tates vary considerably in terms of their populations, political cultures, and political institutions.”); Matthew Potoski, Clean Air Federalism: Do States Race to the Bottom?, 61 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 335, 338–39 (2001) (finding a correlation between
the “political climate” in a state and whether a state enacts more stringent
standards than mandated by the EPA under the Clean Air Act); Evan J. Ringquist & David H. Clark, Issue Definition and the Politics of State Environmental Justice Policy Adoption, 25 INT’L J. PUB. ADMIN. 351, 364 (2002) (“[T]he
general political and economic characteristics of a state exert terrific influence
over the type of policies that a state will adopt.”).
10. For example, rigorous fire suppression appeared to be a logical policy
for many years, but it gradually became evident that fire serves an important
ecological function, so policy shifted to embrace prescribed burns. However, in
part because of this earlier policy, human development had extended into
many forested regions, raising the stakes of prescribed burns. See, e.g., William L. Baker, Restoration of Landscape Structure Altered by Fire Suppression, 8 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 763, 767 (1994) (asserting that extensive pe-
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matching principle, we will show, is counterproductive in such
an environment because it increases the risks of freezing policies in local maxima (dead ends) and decreases responsiveness
to changing environmental conditions.
We will use ecosystems, one of the best-known adaptive
systems, as an exemplar of our adaptive model.11 Ecosystems
embody two seemingly incompatible processes: (1) weeding out
less-fit organisms, in essence a process of biological optimization, and (2) maintenance of the biological diversity essential to
long-term adaptability to environmental change.12 Adaptive
systems sustain these dueling objectives by operating on multiple geographic and temporal scales, such that environmental
conditions are aggregated at different levels and along different
dimensions.13 These basic characteristics already exist in the
federal system. We will argue they are essential to sustaining
innovative and responsive environmental policymaking.
To avert any misperceptions, we renounce two of the more
extreme implications of our adaptive model. We do not believe
that a single model can account for all aspects of the federal
system or, for that matter, the many legal doctrines that it implicates. Our use of adaptive systems, and ecosystems in particular, as a model for federalism does not presume—and we do
not maintain—that adaptive systems are inherently normative.14 We argue that an adaptive model of federalism is well
riods of fire suppression may require a return to the presettlement fire regime
in order to restore landscape structures).
11. Here we draw upon an example from the natural world as a repository
of the characteristics that contribute to the successful maintenance of a system over long time periods and in the face of change. In doing so, we use natural adaptive systems in a manner similar to the use of evolution in the work of
E. Donald Elliott and others on the evolution of environmental statutes. E.
Donald Elliott et al., Toward a Theory of Statutory Evolution: The Federalization of Environmental Law, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 313, 314 –15 (1985) (modeling
development of environmental statutes using evolution as a metaphor for influences of the political and organizational environment).
12. Simon A. Levin, Complex Adaptive Systems: Exploring the Known, the
Unknown and the Unknowable, 40 BULL. AM. MATHEMATICAL SOC. 3, 5–6
(2002) (observing that in complex adaptive systems, “[t]he winnowing of variation must be balanced against the appearance of new variation; else the systems will run down”).
13. C.S. Holling, From Complex Regions to Complex Worlds, 7 MINN. J.L.
SCI. & TECH. 1, 2–4 (2005); Levin, supra note 12, at 4 (pointing out that “[natural] selection is manifest on multiple interacting scales”).
14. The multilevel structure of an adaptive model also mirrors the current
system of environmental federalism. But one must be careful not to take the
analogy too far. Clearly, many features of the federal system have no analogue
in the natural world. Ecosystems, for instance, have nothing akin to a national
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suited to the complexity of the problems native to environmental policy. Nor do we believe that an adaptive model captures
everything worth saying about environmental federalism. To
the contrary, we accept that the matching principle has its merits, particularly generality and simplicity (although its accuracy is often seriously wanting). Instead, we intend to show that
an adaptive model is superior to the matching principle as an
organizing framework for environmental federalism.
An adaptive model also represents an important conceptual advance. It fills a void in the legal literature by providing a
robust theoretical grounding for dynamic federalism, which to
date has been justified primarily on the basis of its capacity to
generate a diverse range of policies and to protect state autonomy.15 Further, while an adaptive model reinforces many aspects of the existing framework for environmental federalism,
it calls for several key doctrinal and legislative principles that
would provide an antidote to the troubling rise in assertions of
federal preemption by Congress and the courts. These prescriptions include adopting a judicial presumption and a corresponding principle of legislative drafting against federal preemption.
The model also calls for a more specific presumption against
federal regulations that preclude states from establishing more
stringent standards.16 We further advocate tempering uniform
federal standards by allowing a small number of competing
state standards.
The Article is organized into three parts. Part I reviews the
legal literature on environmental federalism and the emerging
support for a dynamic model of federalism. Part II describes the
government with hierarchical authority over their subdivisions, and natural
systems are not “designed” to achieve societal ideals, such as justice or economic efficiency. As we will show, these differences do not diminish the value
of an adaptive model; its basic structure is uniquely suited to sustaining a diverse range of environmental policy options and processes for winnowing and
refining them that a federal system would do well to duplicate.
15. See Chemerinsky, supra note 4, at 1315–16; Erwin Chemerinsky, Empowering States: The Need to Limit Federal Preemption, 33 PEPP. L. REV. 69,
74 –75 (2005) [hereinafter Chemerinsky, Empowering States]; Jones, supra
note 8, at 107; Schapiro, supra note 8, at 1411–13; Robert A. Schapiro, Justice
Stevens’s Theory of Interactive Federalism, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2133, 2135
(2006) [hereinafter Schapiro, Justice Stevens]; Robert A. Schapiro, Toward a
Theory of Interactive Federalism, 91 IOWA L. REV. 243, 248–50 (2005) [hereinafter Schapiro, Interactive Federalism].
16. See Pietro S. Nivola, Does Federalism Have a Future?, PUB. INTEREST,
Winter 2001, at 44, 46 (noting the prevalence of federal preemption and observing that businesses seek “compulsory ceilings on the possible excesses of
zealous states”).
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basic features of an adaptive system and explains how our
adaptive model differs from the static model that underlies the
matching principle, as well as existing dynamic theories. Part
III advocates three new legal presumptions and legislative
principles designed to sustain the dynamic attributes of environmental federalism. It concludes with two examples—
brownfields regulation and climate change—to illustrate the
benefits of a federal structure that contemplates dynamic and
overlapping federal-state regulatory jurisdiction.
I. THE ENVIRONMENTAL FEDERALISM DEBATE
The debate over environmental federalism is very much in
flux.17 Two schools of thought, which we will refer to as “classical” and “dynamic” federalism, dominate the current debate.
The classical school is largely defined by its commitment to the
matching principle as a means of selecting the level of government at which an environmental problem should be regulated.18 The dynamic school prizes governmental regulatory autonomy, the virtues of multiple regulatory approaches, and the
benefits of a dynamic give-and-take among regulatory officials
across different jurisdictions.19 Both conceptions raise challenges to the system of cooperative federalism that dominates
environmental law in the United States.
Calls for devolving environmental regulation to the states
figure prominently in this discourse. Devolution emerged as a
rallying cry among mostly conservative scholars and political
activists in the 1990s,20 and it was initially embraced by the
17. Wallace E. Oates & Paul R. Portney, The Political Economy of Environmental Policy, in 1 HANDBOOK OF ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS 326, 346
(Karl-Göran Mäler & Jeffrey R. Vincent eds., 2003) (“Environmental federalism thus remains a highly contentious issue, both in terms of theory and practice.”).
18. The term “matching principle” is a relatively recent one in the federalism literature, as it was first coined in a 1996 article. Butler & Macey, supra
note 6, at 25 (suggesting a “Matching Principle,” according to which “the size
of the geographic area affected by a specific pollution source would determine
the appropriate governmental level for responding to the pollution,” and asserting that “[t]here is no need for the regulating jurisdiction to be larger than
the regulated activity”). For a similar view, see Adler, supra note 6, at 157.
19. Schapiro, Interactive Federalism, supra note 15, at 285–88.
20. As one commentator has observed, support and opposition to devolution
shows some interesting contradictions. Most generally, conservatives
hoped that the combination of federal deregulation and devolution of
powers to the states would lead to a greatly reduced regulatory role at
both levels. Instead, federal deregulation and reduced social regulato-
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administration of George W. Bush.21 The Bush administration
soon backtracked, though, and sought both to centralize control
over environmental policymaking at the federal level and to
preempt state initiatives.22 We believe this move has gone too
far.
In the Sections that follow, we examine both schools of federalism and describe the evolution of the environmental federalism debate. Although the classical school currently has the
upper hand, the dynamic school is challenging long-held assumptions and gaining ground. We also address the distinctive
position of cooperative federalism, which incorporates elements
of dynamic federalism into a classical regime, in the pantheon
of federalism scholarship.
A. CONFLICTING PERSPECTIVES ON STATIC MODELS OF
ENVIRONMENTAL FEDERALISM
The modern scholarly debate over environmental federalism focuses on the proper allocation of regulatory authority between the states and the federal government. It begins with a
very simple insight: regulation would be inefficient if its costs
and benefits were not fully internalized by the regulating authority. The matching principle emerges naturally from this
static economic argument.23
Early scholarship followed a framework set forth by Richard Stewart. He argued that while state regulation should be
ry enforcement created a gap that some state actors have moved to
fill. And while conservatives generally applaud the idea of different
state and local jurisdictions pursuing different policy approaches,
they get quite concerned when one or a few states or local jurisdictions are able to leverage their policies into, in effect, national policies. On the other hand, from the historical lessons of segregation policies by the states, halted only by federal policy intervention, many
liberals retain strong skepticism about state policymaking even in an
era when it often seems to their advantage, at least in regulatory policy.
TESKE, supra note 1, at 238.
21. Barry Rabe, Environmental Policy and the Bush Era: The Collision
Between the Administrative Presidency and State Experimentation, 37 PUBLIUS 413, 413 (2007).
22. Id. at 421 (observing that the Bush administration has imposed numerous “federal rules and mandates that expanded the state government
workload and narrowed its ability to pursue priorities”).
23. See supra note 6 and accompanying text; see also Oates & Portney,
supra note 17, at 342 (observing that a central tenet of environmental economics “is that the responsibility for providing a particular service should be
placed with the smallest jurisdiction whose boundaries encompass the various
benefits and costs associated with the provision of the service”).
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preferred, important exceptions exist to this traditional model
of federalism.24 In line with the matching principle, Stewart
claimed that environmental regulation should be elevated to
the federal level when local decision makers would not internalize all of the costs and benefits of regulatory action or inaction (for example, interstate water or air pollution spillovers).25
Stewart further argued that federal regulation was appropriate
for certain intrastate environmental problems. State standards,
he argued, might be suboptimally lax due to the influence of
powerful interest groups—so-called public-choice problems—or
to competition between states for mobile industries that precipitate a “race to the bottom” in standard setting among
states.26
Stewart’s economic framework inspired a generation of
writing on environmental federalism, and virtually every element of it has been dissected. The theoretical bases upon which
he argued for federal regulation of intrastate environmental
harms, however, have been the most controversial. The race-tothe-bottom hypothesis and the relative importance of publicchoice dynamics at the state and federal levels have received
most of the attention.27 While initially accepted as dogma, both
theories have come under close scrutiny, and some scholars
now claim that neither interstate competition nor public-choice

24. Richard B. Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems of Federalism in
Mandating State Implementation of National Environmental Policy, 86 YALE
L.J. 1196, 1210 (1977). Stewart’s preference for local decision making was
broader than simple cost-internalization, and included the opportunity to reap
the benefits of policy experimentation and nonutilitarian values of selfdetermination. Id. at 1215–16.
25. Id. at 1215.
26. Id. at 1210 (“As a nation, we have traditionally favored noncentralized
decisions regarding the use and development of the physical environment.”);
see also Butler & Macey, supra note 6, at 25 (“[T]he size of the geographic area
affected by a specific pollution source should determine the appropriate governmental level for responding to the pollution . . . . [W]hen a particular polluting activity is limited to a particular locality or state, there is very little justification for federal environmental regulation.”); Richard L. Revesz,
Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the “Race-to-the-Bottom” Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210, 1222
(1992) (“Given our system of federalism, in which state and local governments
have broad police powers, and in which, throughout most of our history, they
have had primary responsibility for health-and-safety regulation, there ought
to be an affirmative justification for federal intervention.”).
27. See, e.g., Kirsten H. Engel, State Environmental Standard-Setting: Is
There a “Race” and Is It “to-the-Bottom”?, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 271, 274 –76
(1997); Revesz, supra note 26, at 1210–12; Zerbe, supra note 6, at 245.
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dynamics support a reversal of the traditional preference for
state-level regulation.28
The race to the bottom is an exception to the matching
principle that, depending on its prevalence, could transform
that principle from the rule to the exception. In a regulatory
race to the bottom, states will sacrifice environmental standards to attract new industries to their jurisdiction, just as
they lure companies through direct economic incentives such as
tax breaks.29 This strategy makes state regulations suboptimal
even with respect to fully internalized, intrastate environmental problems, such as protection of groundwater or land use
controls.30 A principal point of disagreement is whether state
environmental standard setting is best characterized by static
models of perfect competition, in which case state standards
will be efficient,31 or by a game-theoretic model of the “Prisoner’s Dilemma,” in which case state standards will be suboptimal.32
The importance of public-choice dynamics is similarly contested. Most scholars agree that political processes tend to generate suboptimally lax environmental regulation and that this
bias exists in large part because diffuse environmental interests are out-lobbied by more concentrated and powerful business interests.33 Little consensus exists, however, over whether
28. Adler, supra note 6, at 157 (arguing that the division of authority in
environmental law is inefficient as it fails to comport with an analytical
framework that reserves issues of national scope to the federal government
and issues of local effect to state governments); Butler & Macey, supra note 6,
at 25; Revesz, supra note 26, at 1238–42 (arguing that the race-to-the-bottom
rationale for federal regulation of intrastate environmental issues is unsupported and federal regulation in such contexts inefficient).
29. Engel, supra note 27, at 275.
30. Id.
31. See Revesz, supra note 26, at 1238–42. Applying a model developed by
economists Wallace Oates and Robert Schwab, Revesz argues that regulators
choose environmental standards and capital rates that maximize the utility of
their residents. He assumes, among other things, that the number of participants in the market for industrial firms is sufficiently large that no single decision maker is able to influence the actions of any other decision maker. Id.
32. Engel, supra note 27, at 314 –15, 356–59 (analogizing states to the
prisoners in game theory’s “prisoner’s dilemma,” and contending that one
state’s environmental choices are not immunized from the influence of other
states and hence, left to their own devices, states may establish suboptimal
environmental standards in an interstate regulatory race to the bottom).
33. See Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and Environmental Regulation: A
Public Choice Analysis, 115 HARV. L. REV. 553, 571 n.95 (2001) (listing sources
that discuss the powerful business lobby); see also Gerber & Teske, supra note
9, at 862–63 (observing that studies “definitely show that interest group pres-
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the size of the power disparity between environmentalists and
business interests differs between the state and federal levels
of government. The traditional view favors federal regulation
because the achievable economies of scale in organizing at the
federal level might mitigate coordination disadvantages faced
by environmental groups.34 Revisionist thinking counters that
there is no inherent reason to believe that public-choice pathologies affecting environmental regulation will be any worse or
better at the state versus the federal level.35
Other scholars have avoided such generalizations altogether in favor of a highly contextual, case-by-case approach to applying the matching principle. Professor Dan Esty, for instance,
argues for a multifactor approach that considers the particular
ecological or public health harms, technical complexity, time
lags, threshold effects, and influence of special interest
groups.36 Esty further recognizes that a seemingly simple environmental problem may itself have multiple dimensions, some
of which are best addressed at the national level while others
call for local control.37 He argues that in such circumstances,
regulatory responsibility should be divided between different
levels of government.38 Esty’s primary objective is nevertheless
to identify the “optimal fit” between the scope of an environmental problem and the regulating entity. In essence, Esty’s
approach is a more nuanced application of the matching principle. Its most distinctive features include rejection of presumptions in favor of one level of government over another and a willingness to disaggregate environmental problems.39
sure shapes state regulation,” but interest group “influence may vary by state
. . . as interest group power in particular industries . . . and interest group
density generally . . . vary”).
34. Esty, supra note 6, at 650–51; Stewart, supra note 24, at 1213.
35. Revesz, supra note 33, at 578. Indeed, recent assessments of lobbying
at the state level suggest that “the stakes in state policy are high enough that
they are now inundated with requests from interest groups to develop favorable public policies.” TESKE, supra note 1, at 203. There are now “five registered
state lobbyists for every state legislator” for a total of “37,000 registered lobbying organizations at the state level”; collectively, those organizations spent one
billion dollars in 2000. Id.
36. Esty, supra note 6, at 652; see also Daniel C. Esty, Toward Optimal
Environmental Governance, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1495, 1554 –56 (1999) [hereinafter Esty, Governance].
37. Esty, Governance, supra note 36, at 1555.
38. Id.
39. More recently, Esty seems to be leaning more toward a dynamic model
that reflects the “diversity and complexity of the world” and “requires a flexible mix of competition and cooperation between government actors as well as
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The classical school of environmental federalism provides a
simple framework that draws on standard economic metrics to
determine the level of government at which regulation should
take place. As discussed above, this simplicity has proved to be
superficial. Scholars have unearthed a number of complicating
theoretical and empirical pitfalls, which are hotly contested
even among the classical school’s adherents. Deeper problems
lurk beyond the debate within the classical framework. Most
importantly, the classical school ignores the benefits of concurrent jurisdiction by state and federal authorities, as well as the
characteristics of environmental problems that belie efforts to
identify the single “efficient” level of government from which to
regulate.40
B. RISING SUPPORT FOR A DYNAMIC CONCEPTION OF
FEDERALISM
Against the backdrop of the classical debate, a new trend
in federalism scholarship is emerging that is alternatively referred to as “empowerment federalism,”41 “polyphonic federalism,”42 “interactive federalism,”43 “dynamic federalism,”44 and
between government and non-governmental actors, along both horizontal and
vertical dimensions.” Daniel C. Esty & Damien Geradin, Regulatory CoOpetition, 3 J. INT’L ECON. L. 235, 235 (2000).
40. Interestingly, although arguing that efficiency calls for standard setting by one or the other level of government, scholars within this school nonetheless recognize some of the many examples in which the level of government
presumed to be efficient has failed in practice to live up to expectations. For
instance, Richard Revesz has extensively criticized both the design and the
implementation of the federal statutory provisions for reducing interstate air
and water pollution spillovers. Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and Interstate
Environmental Externalities, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2341, 2342–47 (1996); see also
Adler, supra note 6, at 162; Rena I. Steinzor, EPA and Its Sisters at 30: Devolution, Revolution, or Reform?, 31 ENVTL. L. REP. 11,086, 11,092 (2001). Yet,
rather than viewing these examples as a reason to question either the general
assumption that each environmental problem can be correlated with an optimizing level of government or that their chosen level is the correct one, these
scholars simply argue for tweaks to the existing allocation of authority. See
Adler, supra note 6, at 143–45 (explaining that the existence of national public
goods may, but does not necessarily, justify federal regulation); Revesz, supra,
at 2410 (suggesting interstate spillovers be reduced through a federal scheme
of marketable permits in environmental degradation).
41. See Chemerinsky, supra note 4, at 1313–16; Chemerinsky, Empowering States, supra note 15, at 1013–18.
42. See Schapiro, supra note 8, at 1411–17; Schapiro, Interactive Federalism, supra note 15, at 250–62.
43. Schapiro, Interactive Federalism, supra note 15, at 285–317.
44. See Jones, supra note 8, at 108–10.
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even “vertical regulatory competition.”45 This movement began
as a response to a dualist model of federalism premised on preserving state sovereignty by delimiting spheres of state authority immune from federal interference. Finding the task as difficult as it is fruitless, early scholars have advocated strong,
overlapping state and federal jurisdiction. Some scholars have
gone so far as to argue that all regulatory matters should be
presumptively within the authority of both the federal and
state governments.46
Dynamic federalism scholars acknowledge the problems
inherent in their multijurisdictional approach to federalism’s
many conflicts. As one scholar notes, concurrent jurisdiction
has significant costs in the form of uniformity, finality, and hierarchical accountability.47 Indeed, the Supremacy Clause
builds hierarchy into the very fabric of our constitutional
framework of government and accountability has emerged as
an important determinant of the Supreme Court’s federalism
jurisprudence.48 In response, scholars of dynamic federalism
argue that the alternative values it promotes, such as plurality,
dialogue, and redundancy, are worth the sacrifice and that the
dualist approach fairs no better in meeting these legislative
norms.49
Scholars arguing for a dynamic conception of federalism
typically do not focus on specific fields of law,50 and no central
framework currently exists to link the various theories and approaches together. A few scholars, however, have used a dynamic model of federalism as a framework for examining and
reassessing current modes of environmental regulation. We review three examples of this approach to illustrate how dynamic
theories are being applied to environmental federalism.

45. Id. at 122.
46. Schapiro, Interactive Federalism, supra note 15, at 295 (“In the polyphonic conception, courts should apply a background presumption that state
power and federal power can coexist.”).
47. Id. at 290–92.
48. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 576 (1995); New York v.
United States, 505 U.S. 144, 168 (1992); Schapiro, Interactive Federalism, supra note 15, at 291.
49. Schapiro, Interactive Federalism, supra note 15, at 292–93 (arguing
that preserving clear channels of political accountability between the states
and the federal government is all but impossible in a complex commercial society like the United States).
50. See, e.g., id. at 248–49 (describing a dynamic model of federalism that
is independent of the substantive legal issues).
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William Buzbee has long argued that a dynamic interplay
exists between state and federal regulatory efforts, and that
these interactions have been crucial to innovations in environmental regulation throughout the country.51 Buzbee highlights
one particularly important dynamic: the opportunities for state
government officials to make their names by promoting and
implementing aggressive environmental regulatory initiatives
when the federal government fails to act.52 He provides an elegant
illustration
using
so-called
brownfield
sites—
contaminated industrial sites abandoned in urban areas.53
Through this example, Buzbee exposes the shifts between federal and state innovations and the important synergies that
emerge from this dynamic back-and-forth. Buzbee touts the virtues of overlapping jurisdiction in facilitating knowledge transfer and learning, counteracting pressures to succumb to a race
to the bottom, and enhancing citizen enforcement through multiple fora.54
Complementing Buzbee’s work, Kirsten Engel and Scott
Saleska have emphasized the power of regulation at one level of
government to prompt regulation at another.55 The benefit of
51. See, e.g., William W. Buzbee, Brownfields, Environmental Federalism,
and Institutional Determinism, 21 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 44 –
46 (1997).
52. William W. Buzbee, Contextual Environmental Federalism, 14 N.Y.U.
ENVTL. L.J. 108, 114, 115–16 (2005) (“[W]hen federal environmental action
appears to be ‘underkill’ of what written laws and regulations have historically
allowed or required, it creates opportunities for environmentally oriented citizen and state actors (such as state attorneys general) to supplement federal
enforcement or challenge the legal adequacy of the newly relaxed regulatory
environment.”).
53. Buzbee, supra note 51, at 1–2.
54. Buzbee, supra note 52, at 125–26. Buzbee has also pointed out the accountability risk that comes with regulatory overlap: namely, the potential
that it will appear that no one is in charge and hence regulatory inaction will
result. See William W. Buzbee, Recognizing the Regulatory Commons: A
Theory of Regulatory Gaps, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1, 30–33 (2003) [hereinafter Buzbee, Regulatory Commons]. He nevertheless argues that regulatory overlap
contains an “antidote” to this very problem by ensuring that those most interested in addressing a given environmental problem can assess what might be
the appropriate level of government to address it. These interested parties
hope that, in the long term, the association that will develop between a particular problem and a regulatory jurisdiction will erase the “ownership” problem
that results from too many potential regulators. Buzbee, supra note 52, at 126.
For another analysis of the benefits of overlapping jurisdiction in the environmental field, see Kirsten H. Engel, Harnessing the Benefits of Dynamic Federalism in Environmental Law, 56 EMORY L.J. 159, 160–63 (2006).
55. Kirsten H. Engel & Scott R. Saleska, Subglobal Regulation of the
Global Commons: The Case of Climate Change, 32 ECOLOGY L.Q. 183, 189
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this “domino effect,” they argue, is that regulation stalled at
one level of government may be ripe for action at a different
level of government where the political environmental is more
favorable.56 Movement to regulate in one state, for example,
can establish a precedent that prompts regulation horizontally
in other states or vertically at the federal level.57 Moreover, because this dynamic is often useful in drawing attention to issues of national importance and thereby putting them on the
federal agenda, Engel argued in a subsequent article that federal preemption should be narrowly construed so as not to cut
off this important dynamic among the states and between state
and federal regulation.58
Other scholars have advocated a more radical departure
from the classical model. They focus on institutional impediments to effective environmental regulation, at both the state
and federal levels.59 According to this view, current institutional models delimited by traditional jurisdictional boundaries are
ineffective.60 Jody Freeman and Daniel Farber, in particular,
(2005).
56. Empirical evidence exists supporting this hypothesis from both the
Reagan era and the current Bush administration, where political scientists
have observed a marked shift to progressive policymaking at the state level.
See, e.g., TESKE, supra note 1, at 16–17 (noting the push by “regulatory activists” to enact reforms at the state level relating to nutrition, the environment,
and ATM charges when the federal government’s enthusiasm for such reforms
waned in the 1980s and again in the 2000s).
57. Engel & Saleska, supra note 55, at 253; see also Engel, supra note 54,
at 162–63 (arguing that giving states the freedom to develop environmental
policy will create a “regulatory dialogue” between state and federal government and improve environmental regulation).
58. Engel, supra note 54, at 161; see also Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Against
Preemption: How Federalism Can Improve the National Legislative Process, 82
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 20 (2007) (“State laws . . . are an important influence on
Congress’s agenda.”).
59. See Jody Freeman & Daniel A. Farber, Modular Environmental Regulation, 54 DUKE L.J. 795, 809 (2005) (asserting that institutional limits on jurisdiction lead to challenges, at both the state and federal level, to government
efforts to formulate environmental policy); see also J.B. RUHL ET AL., THE LAW
AND POLICY OF ECOSYSTEM SERVICES 284 –88 (2007) (advocating an “institutional structure” for ecosystem management that integrates authority at the
state, regional, and local level); Bradley C. Karkkainen, Collaborative Ecosystem Governance: Scale, Complexity, and Dynamism, 21 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 189,
193 (2002) (advocating the acceptance of a “collaborative ecosystem governance” model that “recognizes the need for integrated, holistic management of
ecosystems as systems, and grapples with questions of scale and complexity in
ecosystem management, emphasizing locally or regionally tailored solutions
within broader structures of coordination and public accountability”).
60. Freeman & Farber, supra note 59, at 797–98.
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contend that efficient, more responsive environmental regulation depends on overcoming cross-agency coordination problems
at all levels of government.61 They argue that the complexity
and uniqueness of many environmental problems demands
flexible institutional frameworks that can be tailored to a specific problem.62 The authors use the CalFed program, a joint
federal, state, and local government effort to manage the San
Francisco Bay-Delta, as an example of their modular theory.
Their approach is distinctive in its use of a negotiated process
for setting regulatory and management goals, which then form
the basis for fashioning a unique multijurisdictional institutional apparatus tailored to the specific problem.63
As the preceding discussion shows, scholars of dynamic federalism have identified many examples of beneficial overlap
between state and federal environmental regulation, as well as
the many advantages of maintaining dynamic, overlapping jurisdiction between the states and federal government. Several
are also experimenting with more ambitious models for restructuring regulatory institutions to enhance the benefits of overlapping state-federal jurisdiction.
C. CRITIQUES OF THE COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM FRAMEWORK
Cooperative federalism, the dominant model for federal environmental statutes, differs in important respects from both
the classical matching principle and a dynamic model of federalism. The policy recommendations we make must thus consider the implications for cooperative federalism.64
In its simplest form, cooperative federalism is a system of
shared authority between the federal and state governments.65
Typically, Congress delegates broad regulatory authority to a
federal agency (such as standards setting, enforcement, and
permitting) and authorizes the agency to delegate program im-

61. Id. at 798–99.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 836–37; see also id. at 799 (“[T]he goal of modularity is to let the
solutions to environmental problems determine institutional arrangements as
much as possible.”).
64. See Denise Scheberle, The Evolving Matrix of Environmental Federalism and Intergovernmental Relationships, PUBLIUS, Winter 2005, at 69, 72
(noting that, under a cooperative federalism framework, “[b]y 2000, states ran
about three-fourths of all environmental programs, up from 41 percent in
1993”).
65. RUHL ET AL., supra note 59, at 282–83.
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plementation to states that satisfy certain requirements.66 An
important requirement is that state programs adopt environmental standards at least as stringent as the federal program.
Further, to ensure adequate state implementation, the federal
government retains oversight authority.67 This residual authority enables the federal government to bring enforcement actions within a delegated state and to unilaterally withdraw a
state’s delegated powers for failing to meet federal standards.68
Cooperative federalism is at odds with both the classical
and dynamic schools of federalism, although the incongruity is
most pronounced with the former. Among advocates of the
matching principle, cooperative federalism unjustifiably expands the role of the federal government by sanctioning federal
intervention irrespective of whether an environmental problem
is wholly intrastate.69 This makes cooperative federalism “both
a blessing and a curse.”70 Although states can largely control
the regulatory programs delegated to them, most of the costs of
the programs are fixed by immutable federal standards.71 The
devolutionist wing of the classical school is particularly incensed by the “federalizing” of local issues, and has singled out
national safe drinking water standards as an especially egregious example of federal overreaching.72 At the same time, environmental problems of truly national scope that warrant federal regulation are hobbled by the inadequacies of state
implementation.73
A cooperative framework fares somewhat better with the
dynamic school. The overlapping authority, although asymme66. Scheberle, supra note 64, at 71 (describing cooperative federalism as a
“partial-preemption approach” under which “the EPA or other federal agency
would delegate day-to-day programmatic responsibilities back to the states
with approved programs”).
67. Id.
68. RUHL ET AL., supra note 59, at 283.
69. Joseph Zimmerman, National-State Relations: Cooperative Federalism
in the Twentieth Century, PUBLIUS, Spring 2001, at 15, 24 –25 (arguing that
the partial preemption aspect of cooperative federalism “increase[es] its complexity and rais[es] accountability issues”); see RUHL ET AL., supra note 59, at
283 (noting that the complexity created by cooperative federalism can lead to
“uncoordinated and ineffective” distributions of power).
70. RUHL ET AL., supra note 59, at 283; see also Michael S. Greve, Against
Cooperative Federalism, 70 MISS. L.J. 557, 559 (2000) (calling cooperative federalism a “rotten idea”).
71. Scheberle, supra note 64, at 71–73.
72. Id. at 72–73.
73. Stewart, supra note 24, at 1215–16.
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tric, at least has the trappings of a dynamic system. Cooperative federalism nonetheless falls short from the point of view of
the dynamic school. The federal laws and regulations are often,
but not always, so comprehensive as to exclude for all practical
purposes alternative approaches by the states.74 Viewed from
the perspective of either classical or dynamic theory, cooperative federalism entails misconceived compromises that sacrifice
either too much efficiency or too much diversity and innovation.
II. AN ADAPTIVE MODEL FOR ENVIRONMENTAL
FEDERALISM
We use the term “adaptive system” descriptively and normatively in this Article. It is used descriptively as a model of
environmental systems, particularly ecosystems, and it is used
normatively as a framework for understanding environmental
federalism.75 We argue further that it provides compelling support for a dynamic conception of federalism.
This Part will argue that the strength of adaptive systems
derives from their capacity to maintain optimizing and diversifying processes, which are inherently in opposition to each other. We will show that both are essential to effective policymaking because environmental problems are complex and timevariant. Drawing on evolutionary models of democracy, we argue that environmental federalism must have institutional mechanisms to sustain policy innovation and resist forces, particularly powerful interest groups, that undermine its
adaptability.76 The Part begins by describing adaptive systems
74. See, e.g., Robert L. Glicksman, From Cooperative to Inoperative Federalism: The Perverse Mutation of Environmental Law and Policy, 41 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 719, 800–03 (2006) (arguing that cooperative federalism binds
the hands of both the federal government and the states). Nevertheless, some
scholars sympathetic to the dynamic framework cite cooperative federalism
approvingly. See, e.g., Buzbee, supra note 52, at 122–26 (discussing the advantages of “regulatory overlap”).
75. Other scholars have drawn on theories about complex adaptive systems. See generally J.B. Ruhl, The Fitness of Law: Using Complexity Theory to
Describe the Evolution of Law and Society and Its Practical Meaning for Democracy, 49 VAND. L. REV. 1406, 1409–11 (1996) (attempting to explain how
and why law “evolves”). As we will argue, however, the lessons we draw from
adaptive systems and the policy recommendations we make differ substantially from this prior work.
76. Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Is Democracy Like Sex?, 48 VAND. L. REV.
1635, 1646 (1995) (“Just as the randomizing factor of sex creates a ‘moving
target’ for parasites, preventing them from becoming too well adapted to their
hosts, so the randomizing factor of democratic politics creates a ‘moving target’
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and then turns to examining how their basic features are already reflected in environmental federalism and how these features can be enhanced to strengthen U.S. environmental law.
A. THE MERITS OF AN ADAPTIVE MODEL OVER THE MATCHING
PRINCIPLE
Environmental policymaking must contend with complex
and unpredictable problems. To anyone remotely familiar with
environmental law and policy, this is stating the obvious. It is
nevertheless an important starting point, as the discussion that
follows is premised on it. An adaptive model, which is designed
to manage unpredictable change, is better suited to the complexities of environmental policymaking than the matching
principle, which assumes many of them away.
Given the complexity and variability of environmental
problems, the number of potential regulatory options inevitably
will be overwhelming, and only limited grounds will exist for
discriminating between them. Our rejection of the matching
principle in favor of an adaptive model thus turns on two variants of this basic problem: (1) the difficulty of identifying the
efficient (i.e., optimal) regulatory approach, and (2) the undefined scale of most environmental problems. We discuss both in
turn as they apply to the matching principle and then examine
how the structure of an adaptive model mitigates them and
manages unpredictable change.
1. The Practical Limits of the Matching Principle
One need only consider a sampling of environmental problems to appreciate their intricacies. Prairie potholes, depressional wetlands found in the Upper Midwest, function as critical watering holes for migratory birds and protect against local
flooding.77 Thus, although geographically localized, their biological importance is national if not international in scope.78 Similarly, mercury emissions from coal-fired power plants have local and global impacts. Mercury is emitted in two reactive
for special interests, keeping their relationships with lawmakers from being
too comfortable or mutually beneficial.”).
77. See U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Wetlands, http://www.epa
.gov/owow/wetlands/types/pothole.html (last visited Apr. 28, 2008).
78. See id. (describing the Upper Midwest as “one of the most important
wetland regions in the world” and “home to more than 50 percent of North
American migratory waterfowl, with many species dependent on the potholes
for breeding and feeding”).
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states.79 One is of only local significance because it quickly precipitates from the atmosphere.80 The other persists in the atmosphere and is a major contributor to rising mercury levels in
ocean mammals globally.81 In both of these examples, the problem does not exist on a single geographical or even temporal
scale, but on multiple scales simultaneously.82
These technical challenges have both natural and human
dimensions. The complexity of natural systems is by now well
known, and the examples of misdirected federal and state programs abound. For instance, government officials for many
years believed that a strict regime of fire suppression would
protect forests.83 It took decades for foresters to appreciate the
important role that fire plays in maintaining the biological diversity and resilience of forest ecosystems and for them to alter
their policies.84 Analogous stories could be told about the environmental effects of intensive agriculture, the dynamics of
groundwater and surface water management, and the many
challenges of assessing the risks of industrial pollutants.85 In
all of these cases, the phenomena are complex, the data are
scarce, and understanding is thin.
Many human actions are adding to this complexity. Rural
land use patterns have proved particularly challenging in this
respect, as evidenced by growing forest management problems
associated with increasing numbers of homes located on the
boundaries of state and national forests.86 Protection of wet79. See Lisa Heinzerling & Rena I. Steinzor, A Perfect Storm: Mercury and
the Bush Administration, 34 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,297, 10,303–05 (2004) (discussing mercury contamination and noting that it is both a local and a global problem).
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. See Stephen R. Carpenter et al., Millennium Ecosystem Assessment:
Research Needs, 314 SCIENCE 257, 257 (2006) (“Local processes sometimes
spread to become important regionally or globally, but ecosystem services at
more aggregated scales are seldom simple summations of the services at finer
scales. . . . We need robust, manageable frameworks for analyzing ecosystem
services at multiple scales.”); Holling, supra note 13, at 7 (“Adaptive cycles in
ecosystems occur in scales ranging from . . . centimeters and days to hundreds
of kilometers and millennia.”).
83. George Busenberg, Wildfire Management in the United States: The
Evolution of a Policy Failure, 21 REV. POL’Y RES. 145, 146 (2004).
84. Id. at 147–48.
85. ROBERT PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW,
SCIENCE, & POLICY 230–33 (5th ed. 2005) (noting the challenges of risk assessment and the frequency with which regulators get it wrong).
86. Jesse McKinley & Kirk Johnson, On Fringe of Forests, Homes and
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lands has lost out to similar conflicts between development
pressures and environmental preservation.87 At the same time,
commercial globalization expands international connections,
adding another layer of interactions.88 The dramatic rise in invasive species, transport of hazardous wastes internationally,
and the growing national and international markets for drinking water are exemplary of these changes.89
The complexity of environmental problems does not lend
itself to standard optimization methods. Whereas an idealized
optimization problem is akin to locating the peak of a single
isolated mountain, say Kilimanjaro, environmental policies are
set in a domain analogous to the Himalayas, where the number
of peaks (potential optima) is so large that it would be impossible to explore all of them to identify the highest peak among
them. The complexity of ecosystem management exemplifies
this point, but many other environmental problems ranging
from pollution control to land use to waste management raise
issues of similar difficulty.90 It is therefore implausible that a
single government entity, including the federal government,
could identify the efficient regulatory solution. Although the
probability of success improves with multiple, independent
state regulators, success is far from guaranteed even then.
Our second objection challenges the assumption implicit in
the matching principle that eliminating all, or even most, externalities is possible. One of the basic features of ecosystems,
for example, is that they operate on multiple spatial, organizational, and temporal scales.91 A single forest ecosystem will
Wildfires Meet, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 2007, at A1.
87. TIFFANY WRIGHT ET AL., CTR. FOR WATERSHED PROT., DIRECT AND INDIRECT IMPACTS OF URBANIZATION ON WETLAND QUALITY, at i–ii (2006),
http://www.cwp.org/wetlands/articles/WetlandsArticle1.pdf.
88. Holling, supra note 13, at 15 (arguing that globalization and dramatic
wealth accumulation “could trigger a rare and major pulse of social transformation”); Jianguo Liu et al., Complexity of Coupled Human and Natural Systems, 317 SCIENCE 1513, 1516 (2007) (“As globalization intensifies, there are
more interactions among even geographically distant systems and across
scales.” (citations omitted)).
89. PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 85, at 34 –38.
90. Karkkainen, supra note 59, at 200. Forest ecosystems, for example,
are designed to adapt to unpredictable change and thus incorporate structural
features that belie strategies premised solely on optimization. See also Levin,
supra note 12, at 11 (“[T]he number of local optima in real situations may be
enormous. . . . [E]volution is a historically constrained process, shaped in large
parts by frozen accidents of times past.”).
91. See RUHL ET AL., supra note 59, at 20–22 (discussing the difficulties of
identifying well-delineated boundaries of ecosystems); see also Carpenter et
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contain tiny microbial species with brief lives and small territories, large mammals with moderate life spans and large territories, and trees with very long lives and modest, but sizable territories. Moreover, specific environments or species may have
impacts that extend beyond state or national jurisdictions. As
mentioned above, prairie potholes appear to be purely local, but
their importance transcends local, state, and national boundaries because of their importance to migratory birds.92
The matching principle fails because no systematic way exists to bound most environmental problems, and thus to ensure
that all of the costs and benefits are internalized by the regulating entity.93 Static economic models work because their predictions can be updated and refined according to a predetermined scale of the problem. Economists, for example, make
useful predictions about U.S. market trends in part because
they understand the different scales of the system. This knowledge bounds their use of the models—they would never put
much faith in predictions about an individual stock over the
next six months or about the U.S. market in ten years. In both
cases, the time variance of the system nullifies the reliability of
the model over the time scales of these predictions. Although
such limits do not invalidate economic models—no model is accurate under all conditions—they do significantly circumscribe
when and how they can be used.
2. The Power of an Adaptive Model to Contend with
Unpredictable Change
Adaptive systems operate through a mix of optimizing and
diversifying processes; optimization is not the overriding objec-

al., supra note 82, at 257 (identifying difficulties in monitoring changes in ecosystems due to differences in scale); Holling, supra note 13, at 3, 7 (noting the
ranges of ecosystem adaptation).
92. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, supra note 77. This position
should not be read as the stale platitude that everything is linked together in
nature. That view is an overstatement, if not a mischaracterization, of how
natural systems are interconnected. Our point is that individual components
of natural systems are linked across a very broad range of scales, although, as
one would expect, the larger the spatial scale, the fewer and weaker the connections.
93. See Esty, supra note 6, at 587 (noting “structural mismatches” related
to inexact jurisdictional boundaries); Holling, supra note 13, at 15–17 (making
the point that under the current conditions of significant social unrest and environmental disruption, “[t]he scale of the issues is such that they are beyond
the reach of any one” institution or jurisdictional authority).
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tive.94 An adaptive model of environmental federalism would
embrace existing processes for refining environmental policy,
but reject the presumption that the optimal solution can be
identified.95 The model also recognizes that while efficiency is
clearly important, it also has its downside—to the extent that a
system is optimized to a specific set of conditions, it may be less
resilient to change.96 The challenge for environmental federalism is to maintain processes of optimization that promote policy
refinement and efficiency, while cultivating a diversity of policies at different levels of government.
An adaptive model has two central elements that set it
apart from the static model underlying the matching principle.
First, it is premised on optimization being relative and not absolute.97 As a result, it incorporates mechanisms, or takes advantage of external forces, that mitigate the tendency for systems to become stalled in local optima or dead ends.98 This
propensity is a frequent criticism of government bureaucracies,
and is evident in nature too—species retain many traits despite
the potential for superior alternatives to evolve.99 The antidotes
in evolutionary biology are disruptive events and processes that
generate random genetic variation.100 Through such exogenous
94. Stuart Kauffman & Simon Levin, Toward a General Theory of Adaptive Walks on Rugged Landscapes, 128 J. THEORETICAL BIOLOGY 11, 12–13
(1987) (observing that the adaptive landscape is a very rugged one, implying
that so many peaks exist that global maximization is impossible, and as a result, noting that these systems are path-dependent and historically contingent).
95. Donald T. Hornstein, Complexity Theory, Adaptation, and Administrative Law, 54 DUKE L.J. 913, 942 (2005) (discussing the balance that must be
struck between “exploration and exploitation” in the context of perpetually refining existing processes).
96. SIMON A. LEVIN, FRAGILE DOMINION: COMPLEXITY AND THE COMMONS
173 (1999) (“[R]esilience and resistance to change are two sides of the same
coin. What is desirable in some systems (resilience) is the opponent of modernization in others . . . .”); Holling, supra note 13, at 14 (“[T]he longer the system is ‘locked in,’ the greater the vulnerability and the bigger and more dramatic its collapse will be.”).
97. Kauffman & Levin, supra note 94, at 24 –26.
98. Id.
99. See Sewall Wright, Evolution in Mendelian Populations, 16 GENETICS
97, 97–100 (1931) (explaining that many factors influence evolution, and consequently, evolution of new characteristics does not always follow from availability of higher-level traits).
100. Id. at 97–100, 102–04 (observing that maintenance of diversity preserves inferior types against selective extinction and, in doing so, safeguards
the potential for genetic combinations that allow evolutionary jumps). In ecosystems, for example, genetic diversity within a species and maintenance of a

ADELMAN&ENGEL_4FMT

2008]

7/20/2008 8:35 AM

ADAPTIVE FEDERALISM

1819

and endogenous processes, adaptive systems sacrifice relative
efficiency for unrealized potential.101
Second, adaptive systems protect diversity against the
winnowing effects of optimizing processes through a fragmented structure and disruptive events. Ecosystems once again
provide a simple explanatory case. Fragmentation, both geographical and temporal (hibernation is a variant of the latter),
creates a diverse range of environments in which competition
for resources occurs.102 As a consequence, selective pressures
vary within an ecosystem and, because of this variation, the
most competitive and successful species will vary too.103 Loosely
speaking, diversity will track with the degree of fragmentation
and differences in localized conditions.104 The resulting functional redundancy buffers adaptive systems from the inevitable
losses of individual components.105
These two elements work in tandem. Ecosystems, for example, are subject to disturbances from fires, droughts, and
storms that disrupt the existing competitive environment(s),
often transforming an affected area into a system dominated by
opportunistic species well-adapted to harsher, high-risk conditions.106 By contrast, if natural selection dictated ecosystem
dynamics entirely, it would cause a steady loss of species diversity and ultimate domination by the most competitive species—
the strong would inexorably win out.107 Yet, by creating a
patchwork of local states, disruptive events create niches for
diverse range of species provide a storehouse of genetic traits and species,
some of which may be well adapted to unforeseeable changes in environmental
conditions. See Kauffman & Levin, supra note 94, at 15 (pointing out that
complex problems have an infinite set of potential answers).
101. LEVIN, supra note 96, at 18, 68–69 (observing that evolution works
through “the continual generation and exploration of randomly generated innovations, and the reinforcement of some at the expense of others,” but noting
that the process is imperfect in part because of its nonlinearities).
102. JOHN H. HOLLAND, HIDDEN ORDER: HOW ADAPTATION BUILDS COMPLEXITY 29 (1995).
103. Id. at 27–31 (describing how the process of local disturbances and variability maintains diversity and ensures resilience).
104. Id. at 27.
105. Id. at 28–29.
106. LEVIN, supra note 96, at 88 (“The small local disturbances not only
maintain the character of the system by maintaining the species that are early
colonists but poor competitors; they also maintain the resiliency of the system,
preserving the opportunistic species that thrive under the conditions accompanying the unpredictable but inevitable environmental changes that occur at
broader spatial scales, such as massive windthrows or fire.”).
107. Id. at 159.
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organisms that can survive under a variety of conditions, ranging from harsh environments with few competitors to attractive
ones subject to intense competition.108 Opportunistic species, in
particular, play a unique role in allowing ecosystems to adapt
to large-scale events or changes.109
An adaptive model can be viewed as a variant of a balanced-portfolio strategy, but with some important twists. In
both cases, short-term growth potential—that is, pure optimization—is sacrificed for the more stable dynamics and diminished risk of catastrophic loss that diversification provides.110
However, adaptive models do not fetishize stability, which
alone would threaten adaptability.111 The unique power of
adaptive models is that their fragmented, multilevel structure
allows diversifying and optimizing processes to coexist.112
Equally importantly, rather than treating unpredictability as
an unavoidable evil, adaptive models harness it to maintain diversity and, paradoxically, to support resiliency.113 Thus, whereas the matching principle rests on the slim hope that efficiency alone is critical and that it can be reliably resolved, an
adaptive model accepts, and even tries to exploit, unpredictability while preserving the benefits of small-scale efficiencies and
diversification.
B. AN ADAPTIVE FRAMEWORK FOR ENVIRONMENTAL
FEDERALISM
Adaptive systems provide an alternative framework for examining environmental federalism. Similar to traditional theories of federalism,114 this framework views the multilevel jurisdictional structure of the federal system as critical to
sustaining a diversity of environmental laws and policies. Jurisdictional fragmentation functions as the analogue of ecological niches in a forest, sustaining loosely self-contained areas of
108. Id. at 162–67.
109. Id. at 165–67 (describing the important role “keystones” play in an
ecosystem).
110. Id. at 159.
111. Id. at 156 (“[E]cosystem structure and dynamics emerge from selection
operating at lower levels, and[ ] feedbacks from higher levels are weak because
of the individualistic distribution of species.”).
112. Id. at 159.
113. Simon A. Levin & R.T. Paine, Disturbance, Patch Formation, and
Community Structure, 71 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 2744, 2744 (1974).
114. See, e.g., Stewart, supra note 24, at 1210–11 (noting the importance of
decentralized decision making to environmental policy).
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policy development that are dominated by localized competition
and selection pressures (for example, socioeconomic, political,
and environmental).115 Just as selection pressures—both natural and human—allow diversity to survive, the myriad horizontal and vertical interconnections between jurisdictions allow
innovations to spread.116
1. Competition and Diversity in Environmental Policymaking
Battles over environmental policy occur at every level of
government. This competition to exploit limited legislative and
administrative resources is environmental policy’s analogue of
natural selection.117 Two primary groups populate the competitive landscape of environmental policy: environmentalists and
regulated business interests.118 We use public-choice theory as
a model of their competitive interactions.119 Consistent with the
general consensus among federalism scholars, we assume that
concentrated business interests are better positioned to organize and lobby for or against legislation than diffuse, heterogeneous public-oriented environmentalists.120 Restated in biological terms, we treat business interests as the fittest lobbying
group.121
The scholarly debate over environmental federalism has
focused on the structural differences between the state- and
federal-level legislative processes that facilitate or impede passage of environmental regulations. Scholars have considered
whether the importance of party affiliation rather than issues
in state elections impedes lobbying for environmental regulations, whether the larger and more heterogeneous range of interests at the federal level exacerbates public-choice problems,
and whether the parochial economic concerns of state officials
and legislators create a distinctive bias against environmental
115. Id. at 1211.
116. Id. at 1210.
117. Id. at 1211.
118. Id. at 1213.
119. Revesz, supra note 33, at 559–63 (describing the central claim about
public-choice theory as it applies to environmental federalism).
120. See, e.g., Stewart, supra note 24, at 1213.
121. See Reynolds, supra note 76, at 1642–43 (observing that the resilience
of a political system derives in no small part from its ability to resist political
parasites, such as special interest groups sucking resources off of the government in an unproductive manner). Even academics who challenge traditional
public-choice theory acknowledge that “[i]nterest groups matter in shaping
regulatory policy, and it is difficult to imagine an environment in which they
would not have a strong degree of influence.” TESKE, supra note 1, at 196.
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measures.122 As discussed in Part I, the objective of this debate
has been to ascertain the appropriate balance of regulatory authority between the states and federal government.
Remarkably little attention has been paid to the importance of differences among the states. This is a striking oversight. While structural differences between the state and federal levels of government remain highly debatable, the wide
variability in conditions among the states that influence the
success or failure of legislative efforts is not.123 From the perspective of an adaptive framework, the state-federal debate
ought to be a sideshow. What counts most is the diversity that
is sustained by the variation in factors driving legislation within the states.124 California’s environmental policies, for example, are not a product of subtle public-choice dynamics, but
primarily of local political, environmental, and socioeconomic
factors that dictate whether legislative activity on environmental issues is successful.125
Diversity in environmental policy is also preserved by localized and large-scale disturbances. Just as fires restart the successional process in a forest,126 so too can socioeconomic, environmental, or political shifts disrupt the dominance of
concentrated interest groups in a political system.127 The rapid
emergence of federal environmental laws during the 1970s is
the most striking example of this dynamic.128 Dramatic environmental events, political opportunism, and grassroots activism were among the key driving factors.129 More recently, the
emergence of climate change represents a major environmental
disturbance that threatens the dominance of the energy and
transportation lobbies over environmental regulation in these

122. E.g., Buzbee, supra note 51, at 45–46.
123. See supra note 9.
124. See Hills, supra note 58, at 17 (“State and local politicians . . . are natural policy entrepreneurs who can significantly influence what sorts of conditions are publicly recognized as problems.”).
125. See Potoski, supra note 9, at 339.
126. See LEVIN, supra note 96, at 88 (explaining how fires can maintain the
character of an ecosystem).
127. Such disturbances clearly occur at different times and to different degrees between jurisdictions.
128. Daniel A. Farber, Politics and Procedure in Environmental Law, 8 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 59, 67 (1992); Robert Repetto, Introduction to PUNCTUATED
EQUILIBRIUM AND THE DYNAMICS OF U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 1, 1–2 (Robert Repetto ed., 2006).
129. Elliott et al., supra note 11, at 316–17.
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sectors.130 The inherent unpredictability of the political system
is just one of many randomizing forces that can dethrone entrenched interest groups.131
The virtues of an adaptive model go beyond sustaining diversity; they also enable regulators to address multifaceted environmental problems. Ecosystems, as we have discussed, operate simultaneously at multiple scales.132 Regulation at
multiple levels of government allows regulators to focus on issues operating at different scales and to draw on different fields
of expertise and experience.133
A forest ecosystem, once again, offers a simple example to
illustrate this point. We will assume that the forest is wholly
contained within a single county jurisdiction. The forest provides numerous environmental services. At a global level, for
example, the forest sequesters carbon and thus mitigates climate change, and it is a repository of biological diversity. At the
local level, it is a source of wood products, a recreational space,
and a buffer to commercial and residential development.134
Each of these services may have local, state, regional, and
national implications, depending on the circumstances, so the
division of responsibilities cannot turn on the matching principle. In addition, the depth of interest and ability to effectuate
a policy response will not necessarily track presumptive jurisdictional lines, and environmental regulation itself often has
unexpected outcomes. These factors indicate that environmental regulation should be allowed to emerge fluidly based on the
level of interest, resources, and expertise that the different government players bring to an issue. Federal involvement, for example, may prove critical to addressing local aspects of some
environmental problems, such as the transportation component
of suburban sprawl. State and local governments, as we discuss
below in the context of climate change policy, may have the po-

130. See Micheline Maynard, Politics Forcing Detroit to Back New Fuel
Rules, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 2007, at A1. Climate change also has important
local dimensions, as not all states are equally vulnerable to it and thus under
equivalent pressures to adapt.
131. Reynolds, supra note 76, at 1646.
132. LEVIN, supra note 96, at 159.
133. Stewart, supra note 24, at 1210.
134. DOUGLAS J. KRIEGER, THE WILDERNESS SOCIETY, THE ECONOMIC
VALUE OF FOREST ECOSYSTEM SERVICES: A REVIEW, at iii–iv (2001), available
at
http://www.wilderness.org/Library/Documents/upload/Economic-Value-of
-Forest-Ecosystem-Services-A-Review.pdf.
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litical will to address a global problem when it is lacking at the
national level.
2. The Distinctive Role of the Federal Government
The authority of the federal government, particularly its
supremacy power, introduces a critical asymmetry between
federal and state governments,135 as well as a fundamental difference between the federal system and an adaptive model.
Adaptive systems do not have anything equivalent to a hierarchy of institutional powers. Different aggregate levels of an
ecosystem, for example, may be connected, but their interactions are not hierarchical in the sense that large-scale divisions
can dictate the functions of smaller ones. Similarly, competition
occurs between species, not at higher levels of organization,
and fitness is solely a species’ attribute.
Institutional hierarchy is unique to human systems, but it
has been embraced only reluctantly. Traditional theories of federalism are premised on limiting the role of the federal government, and thus expect federal assertions of regulatory power to be justified.136 In modern environmental law, federal
regulation is premised on several standard grounds, including
the need for uniform regulations for interstate commerce, the
economies of scale that come with federal-level regulation, and
the distorting effects of externalities on state laws.137 Thus, unlike natural adaptive systems, which emerge from the ground
up, humans have the temerity to assert control from the top
down.
An important benefit of this structure is that the federal
government can facilitate the spread of regulatory innovations.138 The value of innovation is one of the oldest justifica135. See Schapiro, Interactive Federalism, supra note 15, at 291 (describing
the difficulties in determining which government entity to hold accountable
when federal and state laws govern the same issue).
136. Id. at 257.
137. Robert L. Glicksman & Richard E. Levy, A Collective Action Perspective on Ceiling Preemption by Federal Environmental Regulation: The Case of
Global Climate Change, 102 NW. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2008) (manuscript at
13, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1007021); Stewart, supra note 24, at
1211–16.
138. Gerber & Teske, supra note 9, at 870–71 (“[T]he federal government
can ‘force’ states to adopt policy innovations by writing them into federal requirements. This strong federal presence may also facilitate policy diffusion
through federal coordination of policy innovations.”); Susan Welch & Kay
Thompson, The Impact of Federal Incentives on State Policy Innovation, 24
AM. J. POL. 715, 716–17 (1980) (finding that policies with federal incentives
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tions for a federalist system, encouraging, as it does, the role of
states as “laboratories of democracy.”139 However, even if most
innovations originate at lower levels of government, the federal
level is uniquely positioned to disseminate these innovations.
The capacity of the federal government to do so far outstrips
that of the states by virtue of its unique relationship with each
state, as well as the status of the national government as the
top regulator. While regulators in Maine may communicate only rarely with those in Oregon about water quality issues, they
will interact regularly with federal regulators. This hub-andspokes network facilitates the transfer of innovations in Maine
to Oregon, either on the strength of the federal EPA’s suggestion or mandate, or simply through more effective knowledge
transfer.140
These points do not denigrate the traditional justifications
for federal regulation that have animated debate over environmental federalism. The benefits of regulatory uniformity, the
race-to-the-bottom rationale, and the possible disparity in public-choice dynamics between legislative processes at the state
and federal levels are all important.141 The hierarchy inherent
in the federal system thus clearly has its place. Yet, as the
Founders understood from the outset, it poses many risks as
well. From the standpoint of adaptive systems and traditional
theories of federalism, the most obvious risk is the dramatic
loss in diversity that can result from preemptive federal regulation.142 This loss may be a direct result of a strict preemptive
standard or may arise more subtly from the highly aggregated
level at which federal regulators view environmental problems.143
The potential dynamic implications of a dominant federal
role also may be important. If policymaking gravitates to the
federal level to the exclusion of the states, it risks triggering
attached to them diffuse more rapidly than policies that emerge entirely from
the state level).
139. Schapiro, Interactive Federalism, supra note 15, at 267.
140. See, e.g., Buzbee, supra note 51, at 41–42 (discussing the case of
brownfields regulation under CERCLA in which regulatory innovation started
at the state level but was subsequently adopted and spread through EPA regulatory changes); Engel, supra note 27, at 170–72 (describing the transfer of
vehicle emissions standards from California through the EPA to the country
as a whole).
141. See Buzbee, supra note 52, at 45–46.
142. Buzbee, supra note 1, at 1599–1600; Engel, supra note 54, at 184–86.
143. Engel, supra note 54, at 184–86.
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powerful feedback effects.144 Such a shift would increase the attractiveness of the federal government for lobbying efforts, intensifying competition and further marginalizing less powerful
interest groups.145 These effects would in turn encourage powerful interests to direct even more resources to lobbying at the
federal level and to elevating more issues.146 Moreover, because
business interests are by broad consensus substantially fitter
at playing this game,147 they would be likely to benefit disproportionately from such feedback effects.
A parallel concern is that resting too much authority in the
federal government would unduly increase the inertia of the
regulatory system.148 One of the great strengths of natural selection is that by operating at a small scale, the feedback between the benefits and costs of individual variation are relatively strong and swift, in part because individual species are
inherently more vulnerable than ecosystems collectively.149
These tight feedback effects are essential to adaptive change,
as buffering mechanisms, by their very nature, diminish sensitivity to exogenous pressures.150 Accordingly, while increasing
the scale at which a problem is addressed may promote certain
efficiencies, it may also increase the inertia of legislative
processes and undermine the responsiveness of the federal sys144. See Per G. Fredriksson & Noel Gaston, Environmental Governance in
Federal Systems: The Effects of Capital Competition and Lobby Groups, 38
ECON. INQUIRY 501, 502 (2000) (discussing the impacts of lobbying in the European Union and observing that “the move to centralized regulation stimulated industry lobbying” and that “industry lobbying may be stronger at the
federal level”); Hills, supra note 58, at 22–23 (commenting on a similar point
about business interests’ incentives to seek preemption legislation). Hills goes
on to argue that
[t]he task of the courts ought to be to create a default rule that will
force Congress to squarely confront the question, even when members
of Congress might be anxious to evade such a confrontation. A default
rule against preemption places the onus on the interest groups most
capable of promoting this debate—the pro-preemption groups.
Id. at 26.
145. See Buzbee, supra note 1, at 1609–10.
146. Id. at 1610 (“[I]f there is one regulator, then all sides will seek to persuade or capture that regulator.”); see also JERRY L. MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS,
AND GOVERNANCE: USING PUBLIC CHOICE TO IMPROVE PUBLIC LAW 15–16
(1997) (explaining the dynamics of interest-group politics).
147. Stewart, supra note 24, at 1213.
148. Id. at 1219 (describing the “diseconomies of scale” that arise when an
issue is elevated to the federal level).
149. LEVIN, supra note 96, at 203.
150. Id. (“[T]ight reward and punishment loops are essential for any adaptive change.”).
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tem to changing conditions. Setting aside the 1970s, this dynamic is reflected in the slow progress of environmental regulation at the federal and international levels,151 which also derives in significant part from the more abstract posture of
environmental problems that comes with addressing them at a
higher governmental level.
A central challenge for environmental federalism therefore
is to cabin federal regulatory power without nullifying its many
benefits. An optimal point of balance does not exist. Instead, we
argue that an adaptive model of federalism suggests several
doctrinal and regulatory strategies that limit federal power by
reducing the opportunities for powerful interest groups to succeed in enacting broadly preemptive federal legislation that
subverts the federal system. Our goal is not first and foremost
to limit federal power, although that is clearly a byproduct of
our approach, but to establish several presumptions that protect against the unique power embodied in the federal government from being coopted in a manner that will be difficult for
the political process to correct.
C. ADAPTIVE FEDERALISM AS A HYBRID OF CLASSICAL AND
DYNAMIC FEDERALISM
The adaptive model of federalism we advocate is a variant
of dynamic federalism and, as such, rejects the pure optimizing
principle of the classical school. It goes beyond current scholarship on dynamic federalism, though, insofar as it provides a robust theoretical framework for dynamic federalism. Adaptive
federalism differs further in its structural focus on managing
complex, time-variant problems that are characteristic of environmental policy. This Section analyzes these distinctions to
clarify the unique virtues of adaptive federalism.
Adaptive federalism, like its dynamic counterparts, rejects
the exclusive focus of the matching principle on optimization.152
It recognizes that static optimizing strategies, on their own, are
a prescription for turgid policymaking that is prey to the complexities of environmental problems.153 Rather than engaging
in the charade of identifying the one putatively “efficient” level
of government for environmental policymaking,154 an adaptive
151. Repetto, supra note 128, at 2.
152. Schapiro, Interactive Federalism, supra note 15, at 285.
153. Engel & Saleska, supra note 55, at 191–93; Karkkainen, supra note
59, at 200–01.
154. Engel, supra note 54, at 161.
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model is structurally designed to contend with unpredictable
change. The basic philosophies of the two approaches could not
be more different—one is premised on stable equilibrium conditions and rigid control; the other seeks to exploit disruptive
change as a source of resilience and adaptability.155
The basic elements of an adaptive model—fragmented operation on multiple scales—are clearly evident in the multilevel
jurisdictional structure of the federal system.156 The overlapping state-federal regulatory authority of dynamic federalism
follows naturally from this arrangement. Similarly, the existence of multiple jurisdictions at a variety of geographic scales
mirrors the fragmented structure of adaptive systems that is
essential to maintaining diversity.157 Adaptive federalism simultaneously sustains competitive legislative and administrative processes that promote policy refinement and processes
that produce a diverse range of policy options. This pluralistic
model supports the open-ended innovation and testing essential
to managing unpredictable change, without ignoring the importance of regulatory efficiency. It is therefore a hybrid of the
classical and dynamic schools because it incorporates the principle of efficiency of the former, while balancing it against the
need for diversity found in the latter.
Adaptive federalism would support and enhance the dynamic, multijurisdictional elements of the current system of
environmental federalism. As we have seen, this approach is
incompatible with the single-level framework dictated by the
classical matching principle.158 For putatively local issues, such
as those related to drinking water standards or land use, an
adaptive model would allow for a significant federal role. Conversely, for putatively national (or international) issues, such
as biodiversity or climate change, it would encourage state and
local policy innovation.159
The multilevel approach of adaptive (and dynamic) federalism is not costless. Uniformity, accountability, and finality are
all sacrificed to some degree by allowing multiple jurisdictions
to address environmental problems simultaneously.160 Howev155. Engel & Saleska, supra note 55, at 191–92.
156. Engel, supra note 54, at 166.
157. HOLLAND, supra note 102, at 29.
158. Engel & Saleska, supra note 55, at 191–93.
159. Schapiro, Interactive Federalism, supra note 15, at 267.
160. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 576 (1995) (Kennedy,
J., concurring) (“The theory that two governments accord more liberty than
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er, in many, if not most, areas of environmental regulation, uniformity is as much a problem as it is a virtue. Consider widespread calls from regulated industries for “flexible” standards,
such as those found in market-based regulations, and the
vehement opposition to command-and-control regimes.161 Finality, which is often in opposition to adaptability, is also a doubleedged sword in constantly changing natural, technological, and
commercial environments.
Accountability is possibly the most troublesome of these
factors.162 Yet, in practice, important factors mitigate public
confusion. Legislative action is challenging at any level of government, and there are always more legislative opportunities
than time permits. Typically, when legislators make the effort
to pass a law—particularly when it is public spirited, as opposed to narrow and interest-group driven—legislators want
credit, establishing or strengthening their reputations.163 This
motive is clearly evident in the recent spate of climate change
initiatives at the state and local government levels, and it is
certainly true of environmental legislation at the federal level.164 Further, it is not as though the matching principle is a
model of clarity for public accountability. Dan Esty’s multifaceted, disaggregated approach, for instance, anticipates intricate intergovernmental arrangements that, at least in the abstract, raise precisely the same problems with accountability.165
one requires for its realization two distinct and discernable lines of political
accountability . . . .”); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 168 (1992)
(“[W]here the Federal Government compels States to regulate, the accountability of both state and federal officials is diminished.”); Erwin Chemerinsky,
In Defense of Judicial Review: A Reply to Professor Kramer, 92 CAL. L. REV.
1013, 1018–22 (2004) (discussing the importance of judicial finality); Oates &
Portney, supra note 17, at 345 (discussing the importance of uniformity in
promoting the free flow of goods).
161. Arrandale, supra note 9, at 25 (describing the many complaints of
mayors and stakeholders about the rigidity of EPA regulations).
162. Some legal scholars have argued that lawyers need to place less
weight on accountability as a necessary aspect of environmental regulatory
systems, and to recognize that nontraditional legal theories and approaches
will be essential to address complex environmental problems. Karkkainen, supra note 59, at 225–26.
163. See, e.g., Buzbee, Regulatory Commons, supra note 54, at 32–33; Elliott et al., supra note 11, at 327 (discussing the importance of the passage of
federal environmental laws to political entrepreneurs and their jockeying to
obtain credit for passage of the laws).
164. Scheberle, supra note 64, at 77 (commenting on the “scope, intensity,
and very public nature” of state environmental lawsuits, particularly with regard to climate change).
165. Esty, Governance, supra note 36, at 1554–55.
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Adaptive federalism also differs in important respects from
current conceptions of dynamic federalism set forth by Robert
Schapiro, Erwin Chemerinsky, and others.166 Dynamic federalism is premised on empowering states, that is, treating them as
coequal with the federal government and then letting them determine which policy prevails when the policy preferences of
the two levels of government conflict.167 Thus, rather than
avoiding conflict by preserving enclaves of exclusive state jurisdiction (the outdated dualism approach), dynamic federalism
embraces it.168 States gain autonomy but must win battles over
policy on the merits.169 By contrast, adaptive federalism emphasizes the critical role that a multijurisdictional framework
of government plays in allowing policy diversification and optimization to coexist.
Although cooperative federalism is itself a hybrid, it poses
certain challenges for an adaptive model. Cooperative federalism establishes a relatively fixed framework for the states and
the federal government to address environmental problems
through a system of shared authority.170 In doing so, it breaks
regulatory regimes into two distinct categories: standard setting, which is delegated to the federal government; and implementation and enforcement, which is delegated to state and local governments.171 An adaptive model eschews such rigid
designations and prizes independence of action, which strict
federal standards can drastically limit. Federal command-andcontrol regimes, in particular, can leave little room for state experimentation.172
Adaptive federalism would allow multiple jurisdictions to
address a problem independently without circumscribing their
roles or strategies. This would by no means preclude interjurisdictional coordination. To the contrary, an adaptive model contemplates innovative experimentation with regional initiatives
and other midlevel regimes. The point is to allow this to occur
more organically based on the specific attributes of the problem, as well as surrounding political currents and socioeconom166. See supra text accompanying notes 41–45.
167. Schapiro, Interactive Federalism, supra note 15, at 285.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. RUHL ET AL., supra note 59, at 282–83.
171. Id. at 283.
172. See Arrandale, supra note 9, at 22 (providing a real-world example of
how the EPA’s strict regulations resulted in states being unable to address local problems with innovative solutions).
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ic factors. The current system of cooperative federalism relies
on forced coordination mediated through the federal government over the structural innovation-oriented approach of an
adaptive model.173
III. IMPLICATIONS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL FEDERALISM
A previous Section characterized the existence of federal
authority as a double-edged sword.174 On the one hand, federal
policies can respond to environmental and resource issues that
are national or multiregional in scope.175 This might include
global or national pollution problems, such as climate change
and acid rain, as well as the preservation of local resources that
provide national benefits, such as unique wetlands. Further, in
addition to quickly disseminating information about innovative
proposals, federal authority can speed the adoption of innovative policies first developed by the states, establish rules of uniformity needed for further innovation (and commerce) to flourish, and eliminate the problematic effects of interstate
competition for industry.176 On the other hand, the attractiveness of the federal supremacy power—particularly in its negative, preemptive mode—threatens policy diversity at the state
and local levels that is essential to the adaptability of a federal
system.177
This Part draws on our adaptive framework to ground several policy recommendations for sustaining overlapping state
and federal jurisdiction. We begin by describing and defending
our policy proposals. This analysis leads us to consider two distinct contexts in which legislative action takes place: (1) periods
of business as usual, where public-choice dynamics dominate,
and (2) periods of dramatic change, where volatile political currents dominate. An adaptive model, which is premised on periods of disruptive change, proves useful in addressing the legislative processes in both regimes. Finally, drawing on specific
initiatives related to Superfund and climate change, we examine the implications of our recommendations and, more generally, of a dynamic system of overlapping state and federal jurisdiction for environmental policy.

173.
174.
175.
176.
177.

RUHL ET AL., supra note 59, at 282–83.
See supra text accompanying notes 144–51.
See supra text accompanying note 140.
See supra text accompanying notes 138–40.
Engel, supra note 54, at 184–86.
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A. PREVENTING FEDERAL DOMINANCE
The central challenge for environmental federalism is limiting federal authority to a level that is not overly destructive
of policy diversity and innovation. Others have struggled with
this same goal, but have concluded that broad devolution of authority to the states is the only viable option.178 Among them,
J.B. Ruhl, who also draws on theories of adaptive systems, argues that the current federal system of environmental regulation is far too top-heavy and that, as a consequence, it has become rigid and lost much of its ability to adapt.179 Similar to
Bradley Karkkainen and Jody Freeman and Daniel Farber,
Ruhl decries the fragmentation and lack of coordination between regulating entities.180 Further, although they may differ
on specifics, these scholars, in essence, call for a flexible approach to environmental regulation based on a “nested hierarchy of interrelated federal, state, and local government authorities.”181
Our adaptive approach complements this work, but adopts
a different perspective and emphasizes a distinct set of issues.
We argue for a dynamic system of overlapping federal and state
regulatory jurisdiction. This framework is consistent with the
general principles of dynamic federalism. As others have noted,
retention of both federal and state jurisdiction reinforces
processes that contribute to better regulatory outcomes, particularly opportunities for positive feedback and incentives for a
higher level of coordination between the state and federal levels
of government.182 Similarly, the “safety net” provided by the potential for multiple regulators preserves legislative options for
protecting environmental goods that might be sacrificed by one
or the other level of government.183 Concurrent regulation is
178. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 20–22.
179. Ruhl, supra note 75, at 1475, 1477. Professor Ruhl’s approach is premised on Stuart Kauffman’s criticality theory, which has important implications for the basic architecture of successful adaptive systems. According to
Kauffman’s theory, adaptability entails “less hierarchical, flatter, and more
decentralized power structures,” and it places a much higher premium on the
importance (and regularity) of dramatic change. Id. at 1418–19.
180. RUHL ET AL., supra note 59, at 281; see Freeman & Farber, supra note
59, at 798; Karkkainen, supra note 59, at 204.
181. RUHL ET AL., supra note 59, at 284; see Freeman & Farber, supra note
59, at 798–800; Karkkainen, supra note 59, at 201.
182. Hills, supra note 58, at 2.
183. Failure to act at a particular level of government may be the product
of information gaps, the demands of other priorities, or interest-group capture.
Whatever the reason, we agree with Erwin Chemerinsky, who argues that “[a]
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further justified because it mitigates the influence of powerful
interest groups.184 The rationale behind this view is simple:
maintaining a dominant position in multiple fora is much more
difficult than in one forum, and interest-group dominance will
be disrupted at different times and to different degrees by
changing conditions in each state.185
The single most important means of fostering adaptive federalism is restricting federal regulatory preemption. A single
preemptive legislative act eliminates the diversity of experiences and knowledge of an entire level of government.186 This
is a matter of great significance given the dramatic rise in
preemptive statutes that have emerged from Congress187 and
the Supreme Court’s willingness to infer preemption even
where it is far from explicit in a statute.188
We focus our attention on a specific type of federal preemption—ceiling preemption—that feeds the policy preferences of
the powerful business interest groups most likely to leverage
their abundant political power to undercut diversity and innovation in environmental policymaking.189 Our recommendations draw from and reflect the insights of the public-choice literature. We propose three central presumptions for courts and
policymakers that are designed to contain federal preemptive
authority.
key advantage of having multiple levels of government is the availability of
alternative actors to solve important problems. If the federal government fails
to act, state and local government action is still possible.” Erwin Chemerinsky,
Federalism Not as Limits, but as Empowerment, 45 U. KAN. L. REV. 1219,
1234 (1997).
184. Our approach is consistent with calls by other scholars that “[t]o minimize capture, an overarching set of reforms should attempt to bring more
players into the regulatory process and provide the important institutions
with more resources to develop the capacity for independent analysis and implementation.” TESKE, supra note 1, at 201.
185. The rapid growth in lobbying expenditures at the state level over the
past few years suggests that interest groups are expanding their focus beyond
the federal government. Sarah Laskow, Ctr. for Pub. Integrity, State Lobbying
Becomes Billion-Dollar Business (Dec. 20, 2006), http://www.publicintegrity
.org/hiredguns/report.aspx?aid=835.
186. Cf. Hills, supra note 58, at 16–21 (describing how state laws can influence and determine congressional agendas).
187. See TESKE, supra note 1, at 14–15.
188. See Chemerinsky, supra note 4, at 1314 –15.
189. Hills, supra note 58, at 27–28. Here we define a regulatory ceiling as
setting a maximum level of regulation that is permissible, such as the strictest
standard for a given water or air pollutant. See, e.g., Buzbee, supra note 1, at
1558 (defining regulatory ceiling as “the maximum level of regulation or protection that any entity could issue”).
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1. Establishing a Presumption Against Federal Preemption
Maintaining diversity within a federal system requires
that overlapping state and federal jurisdiction remain the norm
and, accordingly, that assertions of federal preemption be used
and applied sparingly. Our presumption against preemption
operates differently depending on whether the issue is pending
before Congress, a court, or an administrative agency. We consider Congress separately in the next subpart. For the courts,
we argue that judges should revitalize the moribund presumption against federal preemption.190 If embraced, this “clearstatement” rule would permit state laws to survive a preemption challenge unless the statute contained an express preemption provision or provisions in the federal and state laws conflict directly.191 This rule would not eliminate federal
preemption, but instead sharply curtail its prevalence.192 Further, by essentially cutting out court-created “implied preemption,” it would require interest groups seeking federal preemption to succeed unequivocally in the legislative process and
thereby raise the bar for invoking preemption.193 This strategy
has the added benefit of depoliticizing court rulings on preemption, which many commentators believe reflect judges’ political
ideologies far more than the legislative intent of Congress.194

190. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230, 237 (1947); see also
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The “Conservative” Paths of the Rehnquist Court’s Federalism Decisions, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 429, 462–63 (2002) (citing the Court’s
failure, in recent years, to promote a presumption against preemption despite
the preemption doctrine’s mandate); Daniel J. Meltzer, The Supreme Court’s
Judicial Passivity, 2002 SUP. CT. REV. 343, 364 –68 (highlighting recent implied preemption cases that run counter to the “clear statement” rule).
191. Bradford R. Clark, Separation of Powers as a Safeguard of Federalism,
79 TEX. L. REV. 1321, 1425–27 (2001); see also CHRISTOPHER R. DRAHOZAL,
THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE: A REFERENCE GUIDE TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 115 (2004); Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 230
(2000).
192. See, e.g., Ann E. Carlson, Federalism, Preemption, and Greenhouse
Gas Emissions, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 281, 305–07 (2003); Chemerinsky, supra
note 4, at 1330–32; S. Candice Hoke, Preemption Pathologies and Civic Republican Values, 71 B.U. L. REV. 685, 760–63 (1991).
193. In other words, consistent with the position urged by Professor Chemerinsky, there would only be two circumstances in which state laws could be
preempted: (1) where preemption is express in a statute, and (2) when federal
law and state law are mutually exclusive. Chemerinsky, supra note 4, at
1329–30.
194. See, e.g., David B. Spence & Paula Murray, The Law, Economics, and
Politics of Federal Preemption Jurisprudence: A Quantitative Analysis, 87 CAL.
L. REV. 1125, 1159 (1999).
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Assertions of preemptive regulatory authority by federal
agencies should be similarly limited. In the absence of express
congressional delegation, courts should apply a strict “hard
look” level of judicial review to agency regulations that preempt
state law or regulations.195 Under this approach, the National
Highway Transportation Safety Administration’s asserted
preemption,196 pursuant to the Energy Policy and Conservation
Act (EPCA), of California’s greenhouse gas vehicle emission
standards would not survive judicial review. Nothing in the
EPCA expressly preempts the California rules and compliance
with those rules and the EPCA is not in conflict. Moreover, the
agency inferred preemption indirectly by arguing that the California regulation is a de facto regulation of vehicle fuel economy
standards, and thus runs afoul of the exclusive regulatory authority that Congress delegated to the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA).197
2. The Unique Status of Preemptive Federal Floors
An adaptive framework on its own does not dictate how the
inevitable conflicts between state and federal policies should be
resolved. Drawing on the lessons from public-choice theory, our
goal is to develop rules that preserve the benefits of federal
regulation without triggering the harmful feedback effects that
would increase the attractiveness of the federal government for
lobbying efforts and thus policymaking.198 These feedback effects are problematic because they threaten to enlarge the role
of the federal government, and correspondingly, to erode state
and local regulation, to the detriment of the adaptability and
resilience of the federal system.
To avert this dynamic, Congress should adopt a new drafting principle against federal regulations containing an express
preemptive “ceiling.” We define a ceiling standard as one that
195. See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
463 U.S. 29, 42–44 (1983); Susan Bartlett Foote, Administrative Preemption:
An Experiment in Regulatory Federalism, 70 VA. L. REV. 1429, 1432–33 (1984).
196. Average Fuel Economy Standards for Light Trucks, Model Years
2008–2011, 71 Fed. Reg. 17,566, 17,668 (Apr. 6, 2006) (to be codified at 49
C.F.R. pts. 523, 533, 537) (“A state’s adoption and enforcement of a CO2 standard for motor vehicles would infringe on NHTSA’s discretion to establish
CAFE standards consistent with Congress’[s] guidance and threaten the goals
that Congress directed NHTSA to achieve.”).
197. The federal government bases this argument on the assertion that
currently the only way to satisfy the California regulation is by improving vehicle fuel economy. Id.
198. See supra text accompanying notes 144–47.
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preempts more stringent state environmental standards, as opposed to a “floor” standard that preempts less stringent state
environmental standards.199 In advocating this position, we
recognize that the result may be less diversity and experimentation at the weaker end of state environmental standards. We
nevertheless believe that this asymmetry is necessary to sustaining a dynamic federal system.200
Our rationale follows from three central assumptions.
First, the relative advantage of business and industrial interests in achieving favorable regulatory outcomes vis-à-vis environmental interests at all levels of government cannot be seriously disputed.201 As other scholars have noted, business and
industry’s greater financial resources, the focus and cohesiveness of its goals, and its hierarchical structure contribute to political success.202 These characteristics contrast with the relatively diffuse nature of environmental interests and the paucity
of resources available to pursue environmental regulatory objectives, especially given their technical complexity.203
Second, we assume that virtually all interest groups would
favor a federal rule of decision over a state-level rule. By
achieving their preferred regulatory outcome at the federal level, an interest group takes advantage of “one-stop shopping,”
thereby obtaining the benefits of its desired regulatory goal
across the nation without the expense of participating in the
political processes of each of the fifty states.
199. Within the category of “federal ceilings” we would include federal
standards that impose a uniform standard. While these standards preempt
less stringent standards, most importantly for our purposes, they also preempt
more stringent state standards. See, e.g., Buzbee, supra note 1, at 1568–72;
Engel, supra note 27, at 291; Glicksman & Levy, supra note 137, at 28–29.
200. Two recent commentators have argued for “asymmetric” treatment of
floor and ceiling standards on somewhat different grounds. Professor Buzbee
argues that given the high likelihood of agencies failing to regulate and the de
facto complete absence of flexible “regulatory ceilings” (all existing laws have
fixed, unitary standards that states cannot deviate from), regulatory ceilings
should be strongly disfavored. Buzbee, supra note 1, at 1558–59. Professors
Glicksman and Levy advance an elegant argument that is based on evaluating
the impacts of five potential collective action problems (negative externalities,
resource pooling, race-to-the-bottom pressures, the need for regulatory uniformity, and so-called not-in-my-backyard, or NIMBY, distortions). Glicksman
& Levy, supra note 137, at 13–22. They conclude that ceiling preemption is
only warranted where the need for regulatory uniformity is high and strongly
supported or where NIMBYism is a dominant factor. Id. at 28–29.
201. Esty, supra note 6, at 597–98; Farber, supra note 128, at 61.
202. See, e.g., Farber, supra note 128, at 61.
203. Id.
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Third, we assume that industry will be most firmly aligned
and cohesive in its pursuit of federal ceilings, and generally opposed only by relatively weak environmental interest groups.
We infer from this observation that federal ceilings provide the
most ready access to federal regulatory power, as they favor the
interest groups, business and industry, that have the upper
hand in lobbying Congress.204 Federal ceilings will thus be both
the most susceptible to public-choice distortions and potentially
the most destructive of the diversity essential to a robust federal system. We therefore apply a presumption against federal
regulatory ceilings.
This bias is inverted for federal legislation containing regulatory floors. While regulatory floors are favored by environmental groups seeking more aggressive environmental protection than that provided by some states, these groups are
universally considered weaker in the political process than
their industry counterparts.205 Assuming environmental groups
are the sole advocates of federal floor regulation, their ability to
obtain the passage of pro-environment legislation will be limited at best. For that reason, we do not see the need for a presumption against federal floors. The very difficulty of their passage will cabin the exercise of federal regulatory authority, and
the likelihood that they will succeed in expanding the federal
role beyond that desirable in an adaptive federal system will
thus be low.
A potential objection to this argument is that industry
groups often support federal regulation, and particularly federal floors. Professor Revesz, for instance, argues that, consistent
with agency capture theory, most environmental legislation is
enacted because of industry support, not over industry opposition.206 Standard economic rationales for industry support of
environmental regulation include the barriers to entry that
they create, rent seeking, the advantage regulations may create
for industries with strong economies of scale, or the markets for
new technologies created by environmental regulations that
benefit certain industries—for example, pollution control or
monitoring technologies.207
204. Buzbee, supra note 1, at 1590–92.
205. Id.
206. Revesz, supra note 33, at 571 (determining that industry-dominated
accounts are “more plausible” public-choice accounts of environmental regulation).
207. Id. at 571–74.
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While we take issue with the accuracy of these publicchoice accounts,208 they do not undermine our conclusion. At
most, federal minimum standards will be supported by a subset
of industrial interests, such as companies that have already entered the market or invested in technologies that meet an environmental standard. Thus, because federal minimum standards will be opposed by other existing or prospective entrants
to a given market, the industry lobby will be split, with some
favoring the federal minimum standard and others opposing it.
For this reason, we do not believe that industry support for federal minimum standards is likely to trigger negative feedbacks
that threaten the federal system and, in any case, the struggle
208. The industry-dominated accounts of environmental regulation present
only a part of the developmental history of any given federal environmental
law. These accounts are effective in demonstrating how the final contours of
the enacted statute benefit the competitive position of certain industries over
those of their rivals. For example, many federal environmental statutes impose more stringent standards upon new plants in particular industries, as
opposed to existing plants. See, e.g., Clean Air Act New Source Performance
Standards, 42 U.S.C. § 7411 (2000). Nevertheless, to the extent these accounts
may claim that such competitive advantages were the genesis of the movement to seek federal environmental regulation, we strongly question their accuracy. For this to be true, the benefits to some firms of creating barriers to
entry would have to outweigh the costs of compliance with whatever environmental standard did apply even to existing firms.
More likely, industries tend to get involved in statutory design only after
it becomes clear that environmental regulation is likely. Take the case of stratospheric ozone depletion and the consequent regulation of chlorofluorocarbons
(CFCs) in the 1980s. Revesz argues that the Montreal Protocol, which provides
global-level regulation of CFCs, “provides a powerful example of environmental regulation creating rents and barriers to entry.” Revesz, supra note 33, at
572. This account relies on the assertion that the Montreal Protocol would not
have succeeded but for the support of Dupont Chemical, which had developed
chemical alternatives to CFCs. James Maxwell & Forrest Briscoe, There’s
Money in the Air: The CFC Ban and Dupont’s Regulatory Strategy, 6 BUS.
STRATEGY & ENV’T 276, 284 –85 (1997). While certainly true, this description
fails to examine why Dupont was spending precious research and development
resources on identifying alternatives to CFCs in the first place.
A more robust account would acknowledge that the looming threat of regulation and the powerful scientific studies linking CFCs to stratospheric ozone
depletion were essential to Dupont’s decision to invest its research dollars in
these new technologies. Id. at 277–79 (describing how calls for a ban on the
use of CFCs in aerosol spurred Dupont to conduct research on alternatives to
CFCs and how a drop in political pressure for comprehensive regulation
caused Dupont to abandon its research program during the early 1980s). We
see a similar trend now with companies like British Petroleum investing heavily in alternative energy technologies because of the strong case for climate
change and expectations that the company will stand to benefit when CO2 is
regulated. See, e.g., Jad Mouawad, BP to Invest $500 Million on Biofuels at a
Research Center, N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 2006, at C9.
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for federal floor legislation will at least be a reasonably “fair
fight.”209 We consequently see no reason to impose a presumption against environmental legislation containing federal floors.
3. Tempering Federal Regulatory Uniformity
Dynamic federalism will sometimes have to give way to the
need for regulatory uniformity, which may be extremely important for certain industries.210 Federal environmental law contains many examples of preemptive uniform standards, although most involve commercial products. Examples include
federal uniform emission standards for motor vehicles211 and
warning labels for pesticides.212 One of the most common rationales for regulatory uniformity is efficiency.213 In short,
manufacturers of goods distributed in a national market should
not be required to comply with fifty different state standards
applicable to the design or operation of their products.
We recognize the value of uniformity, but believe the benefits often will not warrant total preemption. Accordingly, we
argue that in many cases a weaker form of preemption would
yield better regulatory outcomes. The quintessential example of
tempered uniformity is vehicle emission standards under the
Clean Air Act.214 The statute empowers the EPA to establish
national standards for emissions of pollutants from motor vehicles.215 However, the EPA’s authority is subject to an exception, under which California alone, among all fifty states, is
permitted to establish its own standards that may differ from,
and be more stringent than, those of the EPA.216
209. Hills, supra note 58, at 26.
210. See Glicksman & Levy, supra note 137, at 13–14.
211. 42 U.S.C. § 7521 (2000). These standards impose nationally uniform
standards except in California, which has adopted a more stringent standard,
or in a state that has adopted California’s standard. See infra Part III.A.3.
212. 7 U.S.C. § 136v (2000) (requiring that labels for pesticide use and application be uniform under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide
Act).
213. See, e.g., Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens, 53 U.S. 299, 319 (1851) (“Whatever
subjects of [the commerce] power are in their nature national, or admit only of
one uniform system, or plan of regulation, may justly be said to be of such a
nature as to require exclusive legislation by Congress.”); Buzbee, supra note 1,
at 1610 (“[O]verlapping regulation can lead to confusion, high compliance
costs, and a drag on otherwise beneficial activities.”); Engel, supra note 27, at
369.
214. Clean Air Act § 202, 42 U.S.C. § 7521.
215. Id.
216. 42 U.S.C. § 7453 (2000).
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California’s standards have been instrumental in promoting innovation and dissemination of that innovation. In several
instances, a new standard was established in California and
then subsequently adopted by the EPA as a national standard.217 This process was later accelerated when Congress
amended the Clean Air Act to allow any state to adopt standards promulgated in California.218 This change enhanced California’s leverage with the auto industry and prompted many
car makers to ensure that all of their cars met the California
standards, as opposed to manufacturing separate “California
cars.”219
Tempered uniformity, we contend, should be replicated
with respect to other environmental standards subject to blanket federal preemption. However, a tempered regime need not
privilege a single state’s standards in the manner that the
Clean Air Act does. A number of potential variants exist according to the number of states at issue and the nature of the regulatory authority delegated to them. A regime could, for example, allow departures from a federal uniform standard for a
consortium of states with respect to a particular area of commerce for which the states have recognized leadership in developing standards. Experimentation with a variety of regimes is
warranted given the success of the California exception under
the Clean Air Act.
B. TWO STATES OF ENVIRONMENTAL LEGISLATING
The importance of the structural presumptions set forth
above will differ depending upon the context in which environmental legislation is being debated. The history of environmental law in the United States suggests that the dynamics of environmental legislative action are roughly separable into two
primary states: periods of incremental change and periods of
major disruption.220 The former consist more or less of times of
217. Engel, supra note 54, at 170–72 (describing the impact of California
regulations on the Clean Air Act).
218. Clean Air Act § 177, 42 U.S.C. § 7507 (2000).
219. Engel, supra note 54, at 170.
220. Drawing on a similar evolutionary model, Professor Elliott and his
coauthors argue that “environmental law, like other statutory and bureaucratic law, grows, like a living thing, in response to forces internal and external to
the legal system. Sometimes its growth is unrestrained, like a cancer. Under
other conditions, legislation cannot survive at all.” Elliott et al., supra note 11,
at 314; see also Repetto, supra note 128, at 3–4 (discussing the uneven development of environmental policy).
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business as usual in which environmental issues compete for
legislators’ attention against myriad other issues at play in national politics.
The latter consist of periods in which environmental issues
have high political salience.221 This is typically precipitated by
a major event or catastrophe, such as the spontaneous combustion of pollutants in the Cuyahoga River in 1969, the Love
Canal in the late 1970s, the Bhopal, India, tragedy in 1984, and
the Exxon Valdez oil spill in 1989.222 Numerous scholars have
acknowledged the importance of these dramatic events in
prompting congressional action on statutes ranging from the
Clean Water Act, to Superfund, to the Emergency Planning and
Community Right-to-Know Act, and, most recently, the Oil Pollution Act of 1990.223 One could argue that the terrorist attacks
of 9/11 represent a cataclysmic event that has prompted, or
provided cover for, federal retrenchment from aggressive environmental regulation.224 The influence of major disruptive
221. Bradley C. Karkkainen, Panarchy and Adaptive Change: Around the
Loop and Back Again, 7 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 59, 66–67 (2005). Professor
Buzbee describes these discontinuities in obliquely economic rather than political terms, but the basic insight is the same:
Despite contextual factors that lead to the waxing and waning of federal and state activism, environmental protection efforts will always
be largely dependent on the more consistent trends and incentives attributable to environmental federalism structures themselves. Some
of these trends and incentives are not easily categorized as benefits or
harms, but environmental federalism’s contemporary structures that
provide for regulatory overlap and interaction do create some clear
benefits, with some associated costs. Historically contingent factors
can, of course, trump these more consistent structurally created propensities, but they are nevertheless important factors to consider in
assessing how environmental federalism operates.
Buzbee, supra note 52, at 120–21.
222. Karkkainen, supra note 221, at 66–67.
223. Id.; Ruhl, supra note 75, at 1428, 1447 n.164, 1460–62 (describing the
wave of legislation in the 1970s as a republican moment or point of punctuated
evolution).
224. Gary C. Bryner, The National Energy Policy: Assessing Energy Policy
Choices, 73 U. COLO. L. REV. 341, 395–400 (2002) (examining how the current
“energy crisis” has been used to open up public lands to aggressive resource
extraction, often at the expense of environmental laws and protection); Sharon
Buccino, NEPA Under Assault: Congressional and Administrative Proposals
Would Weaken Environmental Review and Public Participation, 12 N.Y.U.
ENVTL. L.J. 50 (2003) (describing how the Bush administration has systematically sought to circumvent the procedural requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act); Glicksman, supra note 74, 768 (describing the dilution
of the Endangered Species Act as applied to the testing of military weapons);
Hank C. Jenkins-Smith et al., Explaining Change in Policy Subsystems: Analysis of Coalition Stability and Defection over Time, 35 J. AM. POL. SCI. 851,
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events can therefore cut either way, for or against environmental regulation.
The factors that prompt legislative action will differ markedly between these two states. We assume that public-choice
dynamics will dominate during incremental phases, while highly volatile political views will dominate during periods of crisis.225 Disruptions will also occur at different scales, with some
of purely local significance—say, a local contaminated site—
and others of regional or even national prominence (for example, mercury pollution and climate change). We assume further
that local disruptions will not receive sufficient national interest to trigger passage of federal legislation, except for the
preemptive variety, whereas problems with national implications may receive attention at all levels of government.
Both legislative states are important to the federal system.
Periods of turbulent legislative action may be compressed in
time, but their impacts will be felt for decades. More to the
point, most of the major environmental statutes were passed
during the singular period of 1970s environmental legislating.226 Periods of relative stasis at the federal level are also important, but primarily because of diversity-destroying misalignments that may exist between the federal and state
governments. As we have seen, public-choice dynamics at the
federal level may be used to preempt innovations at the state
level that are prompted by localized disruptions or grassroots
constituencies in the state.227
Our three policy prescriptions are limited largely to periods
of incremental change at the federal level, and they are justified with primarily this state of affairs in mind. During periods
of disruptive change, the standard public-choice scenario ceases
to be controlling, and all bets are off. In fact, we expect that
these presumptions will be largely irrelevant. As we have seen
repeatedly, Congress will do whatever it wants under the turbulent conditions that often propel regulatory action. Recent
examples of precipitous federal legislative action include the
875–76 (describing how exogenous events like the 1970s energy crisis led to a
relaxation of federal government regulation of oil and gas leasing on the outer
continental shelf ).
225. Elliott et al., supra note 11, at 314 (describing the evolution of legislation as sometimes growing “unrestrained, like a cancer”).
226. Ruhl, supra note 75, at 1460–62.
227. See TESKE, supra note 1, at 11–12; Chemerinsky, supra note 4, at
1314–15.
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Patriot Act228 and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.229 Of course, these
political forces have the same overriding effect on application of
the matching principle. Abstract economic arguments are unlikely to sway politicians under tremendous pressure to respond to the disaster of the day and to establish a name for
themselves in the process.
A multijurisdictional adaptive approach, as distinct from
our specific policy recommendations, has advantages over the
classical approach of the matching principle during periods of
national-scale disruptive change. The standard benefits of federal regulation are well known—its national scope, economies
of scale, technical sophistication, and speed relative to the time
it would take for state legislative action to spread across the
country.230 The scope of the federal government’s power thus
has distinctive benefits in times of disruptive change.231
The status of leading or concurrent state action during disruptive periods is perhaps less clear. Its benefits are illustrated
by the recent surge in climate change mitigation regulations at
the state and local levels of government.232 Current state and
local efforts to mitigate climate change provide important templates for other states and the federal government. Few would
dispute that we are better off when states take the lead in the
absence of federal action. Thus, just as the federal government
can operate as a backstop for state inaction, so too can the
states play a crucial role in addressing even national problems.
States may be particularly willing to do so during periods of
dramatic change when standard economic models such as the
matching principle are likely to have the least explanatory value.

228. Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8, 12, 15, 18, 20, 21, 31, 42, 47, 49, and 50 U.S.C.).
229. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 and 28 U.S.C.).
230. See Glicksman & Levy, supra note 137, at 11–22 (describing collective
action problems found in state-level action and the ability of federal regulation
to overcome these problems).
231. See Karkkainen, supra note 221, at 66–67.
232. See BARRY RABE, PEW CTR. ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, GREENHOUSE AND STATEHOUSE: THE EVOLVING STATE GOVERNMENT ROLE IN CLIMATE CHANGE (2002), available at http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/
states_greenhouse.pdf; Linda Adams, California Leading the Fight Against
Global Warming, ECOSTATES, Summer 2006, 14, 14 –16; Kirsten H. Engel,
Mitigating Global Climate Change in the United States: A Regional Approach,
14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 54, 60–61 (2005); Rabe, supra note 21, at 423.
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C. TWO EXAMPLES OF ADAPTIVE FEDERALISM AT WORK
We conclude with two examples to illustrate some of the
implications of an adaptive model of federalism. The first example, brownfields, is largely local in its scope and situated in
a period of business as usual.233 The second example, climate
change, is a quintessentially international issue that arose during a relatively placid period but has itself become a source of
major policy disruption.234
Both examples violate the matching principle. In the case
of brownfields, which involve local industrial site contamination and economic redevelopment issues,235 the federal government played an important role at two points. The federal government established the initial scope of liability under the
Superfund statute236 for the costs of cleaning up contaminated
industrial sites,237 and then in response to state initiatives, tailored that liability to encourage the cleanup and redevelopment
of underutilized brownfield sites.238 This pattern reveals the
back-and-forth dynamic between the states and the federal
government.
Climate change inverts the brownfields fact pattern. State
and local governments have taken the lead in addressing this
global problem.239 In doing so, they have filled the regulatory
gap left by the federal government’s failure to institute a mandatory program for controlling greenhouse gas emissions.240
State-level legislative actions have led to a proliferation of policies and regulatory regimes, ranging from purely symbolic to
stringent command and control measures.241 In the process,
they have altered the political debate at all levels of government, and by raising public expectations and consciousness of

233. See Buzbee, supra note 51, at 2–3.
234. See, e.g., Peter Baker & Steven Mufson, Bush’s Climate Remarks
Weighed for Policy Shift, WASH. POST, Jan. 27, 2007, at A1; James Kanter &
Andrew Revkin, Politics Shift as Planet Heats Up, INT’L HERALD TRIB. (New
York), Apr. 7–8, 2007, at A1; Micheline Maynard, Turnabout on Fuel Standards, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 2007, at C1.
235. Buzbee, supra note 51, at 1.
236. 42 U.S.C. § 9611 (2000).
237. See Buzbee, supra note 51, at 53.
238. Id. at 40–42.
239. See supra note 232.
240. See, e.g., Engel, supra note 232, at 54 –55; Glicksman, supra note 74,
at 781–86.
241. See Glicksman, supra note 74, at 779–86.
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the issues, created substantial political pressure for the federal
government to act.
1. The Evolution of Brownfields Legislation
Brownfield sites are abandoned or underutilized industrial
sites contaminated with hazardous materials.242 The location of
many of these sites near urban centers or harbors renders them
desirable for redevelopment.243 Many of them are abandoned or
underutilized, in part because the presence of contamination at
the site creates a risk of substantial liability for site cleanup
pursuant to the federal Superfund statute.244 In the 1990s,
business, environmental, and citizen groups mobilized to address the growing brownfields problem, which was contributing
to urban blight, depreciating the value of neighboring properties, and hampering economic development.245 Central targets
of this movement were passage of regulations that would mitigate the potential for liability and ultimately passage of
amendments to Superfund itself.246
The process of brownfields regulatory innovation is a textbook case of adaptive federalism. As Professor William Buzbee
notes, the emergence of brownfields measures is “a history of
copycat legislation, alternating innovations, and generally parallel legal coverage.”247 Under their parallel statutes, the
states were the first to adopt brownfields initiatives that,
among other provisions, protected innocent purchasers from
cleanup liability and provided for incentives to promote voluntary cleanup that terminated or substantially reduced the likelihood of further liability.248 The EPA initially resisted the calls
for reform.249 However, after being subject to severe criticism
242. Buzbee, supra note 51, at 3–5.
243. Id. at 5.
244. Id. at 6 (noting that “[e]nvironmental liabilities undoubtedly contribute to Brownfields abandonment,” but cautioning that such sites “are the
product of many interrelated phenomena, many of which are unrelated to environmental laws.”). Moreover, while brownfields may appear to be solely local
problems, they are occasionally a source of interstate pollution, collectively
implicating interstate hazardous waste management and influencing interstate competition for business. Id. at 24.
245. Id. at 13–16.
246. Id. at 12–13.
247. Id. at 26.
248. See id. at 15–16.
249. The one exception to this was a 1995 EPA regulatory amendment that
exempted lenders and several other categories of potentially responsible parties from Superfund liability. This was classic public-choice lobbying by a
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and the threat of budget cuts, the EPA embraced the state-led
initiatives, and ultimately worked to facilitate and build upon
innovative state programs.250
Professor Buzbee is careful to point out that “state activi[sm] is at least partially the result of preceding federal initiatives,” particularly the passage of Superfund itself.251 Buzbee’s
point is that pressure can be asserted from below, at the state
level, just as readily as it can be asserted from above, and that
despite the early dominance of the federal government, the
states were able to play a vital role in environmental regulation.252 It is this alternating federal-state pressure, which takes
advantage of differing local (or national) political, environmental, or economic conditions, that is critical to sustaining innovative policy development.
2. The Emergence of State Climate Change Initiatives
Climate change illustrates further the predictive failures of
the matching principle and the virtues of adaptive federalism.
Because climate change is caused, in part, by human-induced
greenhouse gas emissions from around the globe, climate
change is widely regarded as the textbook example of a global
commons problem that is best addressed at the national and international levels.253 It therefore presents a relatively clean
case for the matching principle, which predicts that regulation
of greenhouse gas emissions at the state level is highly unlikely.254 State-level regulation is disfavored, so the argument goes,
because it risks triggering the migration of major greenhousegas-emitting industries to jurisdictions that do not regulate
such emissions, along with the jobs and other economic benefits
that accompany these industries (the so-called leakage problem).255
group of special interests dominated by investors and banks. Interestingly, the
amendment was invalidated but was then revived and passed as a 1996 appropriations rider. Id. at 14.
250. Id. at 41.
251. Id. at 55. Buzbee argues that it was the backdrop of strict federal liability that led business interests to seek state measures that would limit uncertainty about liability. Id. at 53.
252. Id. at 66–67.
253. DANIEL A. FARBER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW 47 (2006) (“Perhaps the most striking example of a commons problem is
climate change, since everyone on the planet has a stake and nearly everyone’s activities contribute to the problem.”).
254. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
255. Esty, Governance, supra note 36, at 1555 (“Falling back to national-
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Yet in direct contravention of this reasoning, it is state and
local governments, not the federal government, that have taken
the lead on climate change policy initiatives. For example, California is leading the way by capping the state’s carbon dioxide
emissions256 and mandating vehicle greenhouse gas emission
limits.257 Other states, especially in the Northeast, have also
been active on climate change mitigation. The most significant
action among them has been the creation of the Regional
Greenhouse Gas Initiative,258 which establishes a cap and trade
program that will ultimately cover greenhouse gas emissions
from electric utilities located in eight states.
Global climate change policy illustrates the power of the
bottom-up dynamics that are characteristic of adaptive systems. Although the “wrong” jurisdictions from a static economic
perspective, state and local initiatives can play an instrumental
role in generating innovative policies and propelling change at
higher levels of government. First, state actions bring muchneeded public and media attention to climate change and its local effects.259 Second, state and local governments prompt, albeit on a small scale, critical technological, social, and economic
changes essential to mitigating climate change.260 Third, state
and local governments, as the old saying goes, function as “laboratories of democracy” for parallel testing of initiatives in a
scale intervention . . . invites free riding, holdouts, and inefficient spending of
limited resources—and thus structural regulatory failure. At least from a
theoretical viewpoint, inherently global problems demand concerted worldwide
action.”); Robert Stavins, Policy Instruments for Climate Change: How Can
National Governments Address a Global Problem?, 1997 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 293,
323–24 (“On the domestic level, even the most cost-effective greenhouse policy
instrument will be desirable only if the national target it seeks to achieve is
part of an accepted set of international mandates. Because unilateral action
will invariably be highly inefficient, any domestic program requires an effective international agreement, if not a set of international greenhouse policy
instruments.”).
256. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38550 (West 2006) (seeking to reduce
emissions of greenhouse gases generated in California by twenty-five percent
by the year 2020 in order to bring California’s total emissions down to 1990
levels).
257. Id. § 43018.5.
258. See Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, Home Page, http://www.rggi
.org/index.htm (last visited Apr. 28, 2008).
259. Engel, supra note 232, at 55–57 (noting that state action on climate
change has received extensive media coverage).
260. Carlson, supra note 192, at 314 –15 (observing that concentrating environmental innovation in a given state or states has the potential to take advantage of economies of scale and network effects that are critical to technological innovation, such as those found in Silicon Valley).
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range of contexts that then can serve as models for other jurisdictions.261 Finally, action at the state and local level can feed
back to the national level, as the threat of fifty distinct state
laws regulating a single industry has, as in the past, the potential to prompt congressional action.262
State and local government climate change initiatives also
demonstrate the basic insight of an adaptive model. The diverse range of political, environmental, and socioeconomic conditions found at the state and local levels is a critical, and so far
undervalued, source of innovative policy development—
irrespective of the putative scale of the problem.
Such initiatives also have a clear economic rationale that
defies the leakage problem and the matching principle. Take
the example of state-level renewable energy portfolio standards, which, because of the added costs and thus economic
risks, ought to preclude state action. Yet, twenty-one states and
the District of Columbia currently have standards that require
energy suppliers’ portfolios to contain a certain percentage of
renewable power.263 The socioeconomic rationale is simple—
there are counterbalancing economic and social benefits that
accrue to the state.264 Even on purely economic grounds the
benefits can be compelling. Renewable energy, for instance, is
generally more job-intensive than conventional energy
sources265 and, for states that import electricity from out-ofstate suppliers, investment in renewable energy can pave the
way for a stepped-up intrastate energy sector.266
Beyond the economic rationales, some jurisdictions, such
as the coastal states in the Southeast, are much more vulnerable to the potential impacts of climate change. Other states
261. Schapiro, Interactive Federalism, supra note 15, at 267 (noting the
population and economic competition among states).
262. Engel, supra note 232, at 57 (describing the movement of policy from
the state to the federal level as the “domino effect”).
263. For updates on state-level climate legislation, see Pew Center on
Global Climate Change, http://www.pewclimate.org/what_s_being_done/in
_the_states (last visited Apr. 28, 2008).
264. Indeed, the economic benefits of a renewable portfolio standard are
often advanced as a rationale for maintaining or enhancing such mandates.
See Barry G. Rabe & Philip A. Mundo, Business Influence in State-Level Environmental Policy, in BUSINESS AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 265 (Michael
Kraft & Sheldon Kamieniecki eds., 2007).
265. See, e.g., NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., DOLLARS FROM SENSE: THE
ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF RENEWABLE ENERGY 1 (1997), available at http://
www.nrel.gov/docs/legosti/fy97/20505.pdf.
266. See id. at 2–3; Carlson, supra note 192, at 314 –15.
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may have far less to lose economically, either because they are
large enough players, such as California, or their industrial
base would be only indirectly affected by regulation or might
even benefit from it (for example, North Dakota and Vermont).
Alternatively, the political leanings or ideological bent of a jurisdiction may place a high value on environmental protection
and the citizens may be less concerned about a strict costbenefit rationale for setting environmental policies.267
Climate change policy demonstrates how the local conditions of a jurisdiction, broadly construed, select for different
types of environmental policy. State and local government actions thus collectively generate a diversity of policy options. As
the preceding examples illustrate, variation in local conditions
allows diversity to be maintained in the federal system as in
adaptive systems generally. At the same time, competition for
limited legislative and administrative resources winnows out
policies and experience leads to their refinement. An adaptive
model of environmental federalism would sustain both over
time, preferencing neither policy diversity nor efficiency.
CONCLUSION
Our adaptive model provides a powerful framework for a
dynamic conception of federalism premised on the parallel development of environmental policies at multiple levels of government. By revealing the deficiencies of a one-sided focus on
static optimization and the virtues of sustaining a diverse
range of regulatory options, this Article has shown that a shift
to a dynamic model of environmental federalism would enhance
government responsiveness, policy innovation, and socioeconomic adaptability and resilience to unpredictable environmental change.
The implications of an adaptive framework are not solely
academic. Over the past few decades, and especially during the
current Bush administration, Congress and the executive
branch have adopted preemptive measures at a historically unprecedented rate.268 During the same period, the courts have
267. See generally Kirsten Engel, State and Local Climate Change Initiatives: What Is Motivating State and Local Governments to Address a Global
Problem and What Does This Say About Federalism and Environmental Law?,
38 URB. LAW. 1015 (2006) (discussing the unusual federal-state role reversal
in formulating aggressive strategies to combat climate change).
268. Nivola, supra note 16, at 50 (“More preemptions were piled on after
1970 than in the entire preceding history of the Republic.”); Rabe, supra note
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been facilitators in this movement, often inferring preemption
from the penumbra of a statute.269
These worrisome trends make it all the more important for
policymakers and scholars to appreciate the unique virtues
that a dynamic system of overlapping federal-state jurisdiction
has for environmental policymaking. An adaptive model, as we
have argued, provides a theoretical framework for making this
case. Our hope is that it will help to persuade legislators and
judges to reverse course on federal preemption and convince
scholars of environmental federalism that a singular focus on
the static model of the matching principle ought to be reconsidered, if not abandoned altogether.

21, at 417–20 (describing the Bush administration’s extreme centralization of
environmental policymaking in the federal government).
269. Chemerinsky, supra note 4, at 1314 –15.

